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ABSTRACT 
 
J. Micah Roos: Knowledge, Science, And Religion In The United States: An Analysis of Factors 
That Contribute to Acceptance and Rejection of Contested Knowledge at the Intersection of 
Science and Religion. 
(Under the direction of Ken Bollen and Andy Perrin) 
 
 
 High scientific literacy is widely considered a public good. Accurate instruments to 
assess scientific knowledge in the lay public are equally important. This dissertation expands on 
sociological understandings of the public understanding of science (PUS), specifically, the 
interplay between religion and science in the lay public. The first chapter of this dissertation 
contains a general introduction. The second chapter is a measurement analysis of the NSF-
sponsored science knowledge scale, making use of General Social Survey (GSS) data from 
waves 2006-2010 and NSF Surveys of Public Attitudes data from 1995-2001. This analysis pays 
special attention to the multidimensionality of the scale using confirmatory factor analysis, and 
finds that a topic-area dimensional structure (life and physical sciences) represents the structures 
underlying the NSF scale more accurately than the fact and method dimensions suggested by 
prior work (Miller 2004). This chapter also identifies a third dimension underlying the NSF scale 
that is primarily religious in nature, rather than measuring science knowledge. This dimension, 
termed rejection of scientific orthodoxy (RSO) represents the religiously-motivated rejection of 
orthodox scientific explanations for the origins and variation of life and the universe. The third 
chapter explores the relation between RSO and science knowledge across four waves of GSS 
data (2006-2012), using structural equation models with latent variables techniques. This chapter 
finds evidence that high levels of the contested knowledge measured by RSO (that is, high levels 
 iv 
of rejection of mainstream science explanations for origins) are associated with lower levels of 
uncontested physical and life sciences knowledge, independent of educational attainment, 
religious tradition, age, sex, race, and other factors. An additional finding is that relative to 
unaffiliated respondents, evangelical Protestants and Catholics have an overall lower level of 
uncontested science knowledge. A fourth chapter examines the persistence of RSO and examines 
whether there is a downward, upward, or stable trend in individuals’ RSO. Additionally, this 
chapter tests three models representing the relationship between RSO and religious attendance, 
where: (1) RSO is specified to influence religious attendance, (2) religious attendance is 
specified to influence RSO, and (3) religious and RSO each has a unique change trajectory over 
time. A fifth chapter contains general conclusions and suggestions for future research. 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
1 - Introduction 
 The past two centuries has seen an explosion of scientific discovery. In particular, 
Linnaean and other theories of evolution were upended following the publication of Darwin’s On 
the Origin of Species (1859), building on ideas of uniformitarianism1 from Lyell’s Principles of 
Geology (1830). Since Darwin’s time, the work of Julian Huxley, Stephen Jay Gould, and E. O. 
Wilson have refined and expanded his original contribution, and the wealth of our understanding 
of the processes that contribute to the growing complexity and variation of life has grown 
considerably. However, evolution remains a hotly contested set of theories in the general public 
of the United States, and while our society-level understanding of these processes may be 
detailed and expansive, at the individual level many US adults either do not understand or 
vehemently reject these ideas, to the point that various movement organizations press for the 
introduction of biblical creationism or intelligent design alongside evolution in public school 
science curricula (Binder 2004, 2007; Forrest and Gross 2004) or the removal of evolution from 
curricula altogether. 
 More generally, trust in science as an institution has been on the decline among certain 
groups (political conservatives, in particular), and science more generally may be undergoing a 
“legitimacy problem” (Gauchat 2010, 2012). Lack of trust in the scientific institution is likely 
                                                
1 Uniformitarianism is the idea that the simple physical processes we can witness now, such as 
sedimentation and erosion have likely always worked as they do today. Therefore, multilayered 
geological strata and deep erosion canyons must mean that the Earth is very old. 
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related to scientific knowledge, however, the associations between political conservatism and 
reduced trust in science that Gauchat discovered do not seem to translate to reduced levels of 
science knowledge for political conservatives. An investigation of how religion plays a part in 
general trust in and knowledge of science was beyond the scope of Gauchat’s analyses, and some 
argue that it is impossible to understand the US general public’s attitudes about science without 
an eye to religious factors (Ecklund 2010; Ellison and Musick 1995; Evans and Evans 2008; 
Evans 2013; Sherkat 2011). In the chapters to follow, I will examine the relation of measures of 
religious identity and science knowledge to better explain disparities in science knowledge in the 
US general public. The main foci of this dissertation are an investigation of demographic and 
social factors that contribute to disparities in science knowledge in the United States, as well as 
the structure of that science knowledge (i.e. the constructs that underlie it). As this dissertation is 
a part of the academic knowledge enterprise, in it I, as author, take the position that heightened 
general knowledge and understanding of science is a public good. 
 There has been some recent scholarship on general trust in science (Gauchat 2010, 2012), 
the intersection of science and religion in the minds of both practitioners and the general public 
(Ecklund and Park 2009; Ecklund and Scheitle 2007; Ecklund 2010; Evans and Evans 2008; 
Evans 2011; Sherkat 2011), as well as work that suggests that the United States may be lagging 
behind other nations in science education (Miller, Scott, and Okamoto 2006) - and in a recent 
report from the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), the US ranked only 
31st out of 65 included countries (OECD 2011) in science literacy among primary and secondary 
school students. 
 In a democratic political system such as ours, the problem of disparities in knowledge 
about the natural world becomes critical. Lack of understanding about precisely how such 
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knowledge about the natural world is generated may be just as critical. Whenever a science 
policy issue is discussed – be it tied together with moral issues like stem cell research, or 
business and environmental concerns like global climate change – poor science knowledge may 
lead to voters making poorly informed choices. What is worse, the uninformed can be easily co-
opted for political goals and effectively duped into voting against their own interests due to a 
poor understanding of the science-related issues under debate. This dissertation aims to examine 
these disparities in science knowledge in the adult population of the United States. 
2 - Religion and Disparities in Science Knowledge 
 Disparities in science knowledge have several implications. Demographic disparities in 
science knowledge may help understand the potential science, technology, engineering, and math 
(STEM) crisis. If the United States is to avoid a STEM worker shortage in the coming decades, 
identifying which groups are most likely to avoid or be uninterested in science is crucial.  
 Low overall levels of science knowledge may influence public support for science 
funding. As the public debate in mid 2013 over the import of political science funding shows, 
federal science funding is vulnerable to political attack. Those areas that are least understood are 
more vulnerable. Similarly, areas of scientific inquiry that are under contest (such as 
evolutionary biology) are even more vulnerable. It is important to examine rates of 
understanding (and acceptance) of these ideas in the general public, as well as how those rates 
are likely to shift over time to understand how public support for science funding may ebb and 
flow over the next several decades. 
 Certain contested areas of scientific knowledge, such as evolution (and related ideas) may 
have rates of acceptance or understanding that differ from overall general rates of science 
understanding. Low rates of acceptance or knowledge of general science in these areas have 
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unique implications. One, a population with low rates of acceptance of evolution may give rise to 
more motivated supporters of movements to introduce creationism or intelligent design in school 
curricula, a key goal of some groups (Forrest and Gross 2004). Additionally, the rejection of 
evolution in specific and science as an institution more generally may serve as a key form of 
“collective identity” (Polletta and Jasper 2001) around which social actors may be mobilized 
towards those goals. And, as the rejection of evolution may be a component of a broad, religious 
conservative constellation of ideas (Perrin, Roos, and Gauchat Forthcoming), high rates of 
rejection of evolution and related ideas may contribute to mobilization towards other 
conservative religious goals in education, such as limited sex education or in-school prayer. 
3 - Theoretical Foundation 
Contested and uncontested science knowledge 
 Many areas in science are relatively uncontested – that is, the legitimacy of science as an 
institution (Gauchat 2010, 2012) is not in question. Gravity, thermodynamics, kinetics, 
combustion; many areas in basic physics, chemistry, biology and other sciences are not viewed 
by the general public (implicitly or explicitly) as in conflict with other sources of knowledge. 
These uncontested areas yield “facts” that are widely accepted by most in the general public. One 
such fact is that falling bodies fall at the same rate, regardless of mass (and net of wind 
resistance), a fact Galileo demonstrated evidence of in 1589 at the Leaning Tower of Pisa. David 
Scott (an astronaut on the Apollo 15 mission) recreated Galileo’s experiment on the moon in 
1971, using a hammer and feather (without wind resistance, the hammer and feather fell at the 
same rate). Other such uncontested facts include the relation between the boiling point of water, 
relative air pressure and water purity, that the angle of the Sun’s rays striking the Earth are the 
cause of seasons, and that the Sun, Moon, and even Jupiter contribute to the oceanic tides on 
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Earth. Uncontested “facts” are not universally so, nor are they necessarily truth. Rather, in the 
US American case (which is the perspective of this author), there are no competing truth claims. 
 However, not all areas of scientific discovery are uncontested. Evolution (and related 
ideas) is one particularly controversial area in science. While Evolution tends to be uncontested 
among scientific practitioners, particularly those working in closely related areas, it remains 
hotly debated in the US general public. A sizable minority of the US population rejects the idea 
that humans evolved from earlier forms (Newport 2012; Plutzer and Berkman 2008), which is 
evidence that at least one competing truth claim (in addition to that of mainstream science) exists 
in the area of explaining the origin of life, the source of life’s complexity and variation, and the 
origins of the universe (henceforth referred to as origins). 
 Contested Knowledge is a concept not too far removed from contested meanings 
(Gusfield 1996; Tavory and Swidler 2009), although rather than focusing on the contestation of 
the cultural meanings of specific knowledges, the concept contested knowledge as I am using it 
here refers also to the process by which knowledge becomes contested. That process is as 
follows: when spheres of knowledge authority intersect, there are competing truth claims 
available for phenomena. There are also competing rules and criteria for judging those truth 
claims, and a selection of one truth claim over others is ultimately a selection of those rules and 
criteria as well. Thus, conflict over evolution versus creationism is, in part, conflict over the 
standards for collecting and assessing empirical versus faith-based evidence. 
 Positions within a contested knowledge area may have spillover effects to uncontested 
areas. Because not only competing truth claims are in conflict in a contested knowledge area, but 
also the rules and criteria for judging the legitimacy of such truth claims, a strong position in a 
contested area can lead to the devaluation in the set of rules and criteria related to the “losing” 
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truth claim. Spillover effects then result in the devaluation of those rules and criteria being 
extended to uncontested knowledge outside the contested area and related to the opposed sphere 
of knowledge authority (spheres may differ depending on the specific knowledge area, for the 
area of evolution and related ideas the overlapping or opposed spheres of knowledge authority 
are the scientific and religious spheres). 
4 - Contributions 
 This dissertation contributes to our understanding of religious and other factors that 
contribute to understanding, acceptance, and rejection of scientific ideas in several ways. The 
first of these is a more detailed measurement analysis of the factors that underlie a popular and 
widely available scale intended to measure science knowledge. This measurement analysis 
provides other researchers tools to adequately measure science knowledge without unnecessarily 
including confounding influences of religiosity.  
 The second contribution is evidence supporting the claim that conservative Protestants 
have overall lower levels of science knowledge than either unaffiliated persons or persons with 
other religious affiliations, in the United States. This finding addresses the disagreement 
encapsulated in the recent papers by Sherkat (2011) and Evans (2011, 2013) over the relation 
between conservative forms of Protestantism and science knowledge, although this negative 
effect is fully mediated by common covariates and a measure of the rejection of evolution and 
related ideas.  
 A third contribution is the introduction and explanation of the concept of contested 
knowledge. Related both to the concept of contested meanings (Gusfield 1996; Tavory and 
Swidler 2009) as well as epistemological conflict (Evans and Evans 2008; Evans 2011), 
contested knowledge (and related spillover effects) provides a way of conceptualizing the ways 
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that the legitimacy and veracity of knowledge may be challenged, discounted, or dismissed, and 
the ways that this challenge or dismissal may have impact beyond the specific area of 
contestation. 
 Building on the previous contributions, this dissertation also presents an examination of 
the life course and demographics of the rejection of evolution and related ideas. The previous 
section outlined the critical nature of many of the implications of high rates of the rejection of 
evolution. Because relatively little previous work exists on this issue, the fourth chapter of this 
dissertation presents an analysis of change trajectories for the rejection of evolution (and related 
ideas). While there has been much scholarly interest in the life course patterns of religious 
service attendance (Hayward and Krause 2013; Petts 2009; Schwadel 2011; Uecker, Regnerus, 
and Vaaler 2007), there is some disagreement about what survey measures of religious 
attendance are really measuring, behavior or identity (Brenner 2011; Hadaway, Marler, and 
Chaves 1993). Chapter four explores the change trajectories of religious attendance as well as the 
relation between rejection of evolution and religious service attendance without forcing the 
conceptual definition of the attendance measure to be either solely an indicator of behavior or 
identity. 
5 - Structure of this Volume 
 This dissertation consists of three inter-related papers, as well as introductory and 
concluding chapters. A brief synopsis of the chapters follows. Chapter 2 details a measurement 
analysis of the NSF science knowledge scale. This scale was included in the NSF Surveys of 
Public Attitudes Toward And Understanding of Science And Technology, 1979-2006 (Miller et 
al. 2009) and since 2006, the General Social Survey (GSS). In this chapter I test several 
theoretical model structures from the relevant literature that are thought to underlie the NSF 
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scale, as well as a new structure introduced in the chapter using confirmatory factor analysis 
(CFA) within the structural equation modeling (SEM) framework. I also identify several scale 
indicators that may be tapping an aspect of religiosity as well as science knowledge. I 
demonstrate evidence that these indicators are indeed tapping religiosity, and moreover that two 
of them are very poor measures of science knowledge. I term this dimension Young Earth 
Worldview (YEW), and find YEW to be negatively correlated with other dimensions of science 
knowledge. This chapter has been published in the journal Public Understanding of Science 
(Roos 2012). 
 Chapter 3 is an explication of the relationship between YEW (renamed in this and 
subsequent chapters The Rejection of Scientific Orthodoxy (RSO)) and uncontested forms of 
science knowledge. This chapter also develops the concept of contested knowledge in greater 
depth, and proposes that in certain cases there may be spillover effects from positions within 
contested knowledge areas to uncontested areas, resulting in reductions in acceptance or 
awareness of uncontested knowledge. In this chapter I also explore the relation of conservative 
Protestantism and science knowledge, a relationship that in the sociology of religion literature is 
alternately marked and negative (Sherkat 2011) or insignificant (Evans 2011). I explore these 
questions by fitting a SEM where RSO is an intervening variable between demographic 
covariates and uncontested science knowledge. 
 Chapter 4 is an examination of the change trajectory of RSO over time as well as the 
relation between the RSO dimension and a survey measure of religious service attendance 
present in the GSS. One ongoing discussion in the sociology of religion literature is the degree to 
which survey measures of religious attendance are measuring practices and behaviors or identity 
presentation. Additionally, when religious attendance is included as a covariate in Chapter 3, a 
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strong association between attendance and RSO is evident. I propose three likely models to 
capture this relationship: (1) religious attendance influences RSO, (2) RSO influences 
attendance, and (3) while correlated, both RSO and religious attendance have unique change 
trajectories with unique slopes and intercepts. I test this using latent growth curve models 
(LCMs) within the SEM framework. 
 These chapters are followed by a general conclusion. 
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CHAPTER II: MEASURING SCIENCE OR RELIGION? A MEASUREMENT 
ANALYSIS OF THE NSF SPONSORED SCIENCE LITERACY SCALE 2006-2010 
 
1 - Introduction 
 High scientific literacy in a nation’s citizens is generally considered a public good, 
particularly in democratic societies, as an informed public makes better choices. It is also 
important to develop means of assessing the scientific literacy of the public, and towards that end 
the National Science Foundation (NSF) science knowledge scale is the main instrument for 
measuring civic scientific literacy in the United States. However, the scale is frequently misused, 
and this misuse provides an inaccurate picture of the landscape of science literacy in the US 
American public, contributes to poor sociological understandings of science knowledge 
inequalities, as well as weakening understandings of the effects of poor science knowledge2. 
Recent studies of science knowledge have used variations of the same science knowledge 
scales; substituting in some items for others and dropping other items entirely (Miller 1998, 
2004; National Science Board 2010, 2012) -- often without attention to how this may alter the 
validity and reliability of the scale. This paper uses the NSF science knowledge scale, which has 
appeared in each cross-sectional wave of the General Social Survey (GSS) since 2006 and in the 
NSF Surveys of Public Attitudes Toward And Understanding of Science And Technology since 
1979 (with the current scale form since 1995). This scale has been used by those writing within 
the Public Understanding of Science (PUS) area as well as within general Sociology (Bauer, 
                                                
2 In this paper I use “science literacy” and “science knowledge” interchangeably. 
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Allum, and Miller 2007; Evans 2011; Gauchat 2010; Miller 1998, 2004; Sherkat 2011; Sturgis 
and Allum 2004)3. 
Confirmatory factor analyses of this scale have not been published since Miller’s review 
(1998, 2004), the most recent of which used 1999 data from the NSF Surveys dataset. This paper 
contributes a measurement analysis of the NSF science knowledge scale in the 2006-10 and will 
demonstrate a model structure that fits the data better than either Miller’s two dimensions of 
science literacy or the unidimensional way the scale is normally used. In this paper I present a 
measurement analysis for science knowledge as a latent variable using data from the 2006, 2008, 
and 2010 General Social Survey (GSS), as well as earlier non-GSS samples. 
Jon Miller (1983, 1987, 1998) proposed a two-dimensional structure for science literacy: 
a fact-based knowledge dimension and a methodology or process dimension. Miller (1998) calls 
these two dimensions combined civic scientific literacy, and stresses the difference between lay 
understanding of science and professional understanding -- the scale is meant to measure the 
former. Miller’s own definition of his dimensions are: “(1) a vocabulary of basic scientific 
constructs sufficient to read competing views in a newspaper or magazine, (2) an understanding 
of the process or nature of scientific inquiry” (Miller 1998:205). Miller raises the problem of 
multidimensionality in his paper and leaves the door open for structures other than the one he 
proposed. 
For the purposes of this paper, I define science knowledge as follows: The knowledge 
required to read and understand the science section or science-focused articles of a major news 
website, such as npr.org or cnn.com; allowing for topical areas of interest. Necessarily multi-
                                                
3 This paper uses data from the 2006-2010 waves of the General Social Survey (GSS), a bi-
yearly cross section of the US population (Davis, Smith, and Marsden 2009; Smith et al. 2010). 
This paper also uses data from the National Science Foundation Surveys of Public Attitudes 
Toward And Understanding of Science And Technology (Miller et al. 2009). 
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dimensional, this definition requires the understanding of the methods and process of science as 
well as some basic textbook-level facts related to specific scientific topic areas. It is similar to 
the two-dimensional definition proposed by Miller (1983, 1987, 1998, 2004) with one minor 
change: Based loosely on the work of G. Evans and Durant (1995) who found that the attitude-
knowledge link varied in strength and direction depending on which topical subarea within 
science was under investigation, my proposed dimensional structure of science knowledge is as 
follows: like Miller, it has a sub-dimension consisting of knowledge about the methods and 
process of science - knowledge of not only why a control group is used in most experimental 
treatments but also an understanding of why this is so or what benefits arise from a control 
group. I allow science knowledge to break into topic areas, such as life sciences and physical 
sciences, in addition to a methods dimension. In general, it is reasonable to assume that some 
may possess greater knowledge of physics or chemistry than of biology or genetics, and splitting 
the “textbook” or factual knowledge sub-dimension allows for this specialization.  
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Table 1: NSF science knowledge scale questions with GSS variable names 
Now, please think about this situation. Two scientists want to know if a certain drug is effective 
against high blood pressure. The first scientist wants to give the drug to one thousand people with 
high blood pressure and see how many of them experience lower blood pressure levels. The second 
scientist wants to give the drug to five hundred people with high blood pressure, and not give the 
drug to another five hundred people with high blood pressure, and see how many in both groups 
experience lower blood pressure levels. 
  
EXPDESGN: Which is the better way to test this drug? 
1: All 1000 get the drug  
2: 500 get the drug; 500 don't  
  
Now, think about this situation. A doctor tells a couple that their genetic makeup means that 
they’ve got one in four chances of having a child with an inherited illness. (Answers took the form: 
Yes, No, or Don’t Know) 
 
ODDS1: Does this mean that if their first child has the illness, the next three will not have the 
illness? 
ODDS2: Does this mean that each of the couple’s children will have the same risk of 
suffering from the illness? 
  
Now, I would like to ask you a few short questions like those you might see on a television game 
show. For each statement that I read, please tell me if it is true or false. If you don’t know or aren’t 
sure, just tell me so, and we will skip to the next question. Remember true, false, or don’t know. 
 
HOTCORE: First, the center of the Earth is very hot. Is that true or false? 
RADIOACT: All radioactivity is man-made. (Is that true or false?) 
BOYORGRL: It is the father’s gene that decides whether the baby is a boy or a girl. (Is that true or 
false?) 
LASERS: Lasers work by focusing sound waves. (Is that true or false?) 
ELECTRON: Electrons are smaller than atoms. (Is that true or false?) 
VIRUSES: Antibiotics kill viruses as well as bacteria. (Is that true or false?) 
BIGBANG: The universe began with a huge explosion. (Is that true or false?) 
CONDRIFT: The continents on which we live have been moving their locations for millions of 
years and will continue to move in the future. (Is that true or false?) 
EVOLVED: Human beings, as we know them today, developed from earlier species of animals. 
(Is that true or false?) 
EARTHSUN: Now, does the Earth go around the Sun, or does the Sun go around the Earth? 
SOLARREV1: How long does it take for the Earth to go around the Sun: one day, one month, or 
one year? 
All items had a “don’t know” response option, and these were coded as incorrect answers in each case, as done by 
Evans (2011) and (Gauchat 2010), with the reasoning that for an item assessing factual knowledge, a “don’t know” 
response is incorrect. 
1: (EARTHSUN and SOLARREV are combined as one item in the NSF’s Indicators, I combine them here as 
SOLARREV was only asked if a correct answer was given for EARTHSUN) 
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 In recent months, there has been some debate over the validity of two of the items in the 
NSF science scale -- “evolved” and “bigbang” (see question wording in Table 1). These two 
items, the result of answers to questions about evolution and the big bang, respectively, are seen 
as either spanning multiple domains (that of science and that of religion), and thus requiring 
additional specification text (i.e. “according to astronomers”, see Bhattacharjee 2011), or as not 
relating to science knowledge at all. All of which lead to the decision to drop descriptive 
statistics about the two items from the 2010 Indicators (Bhattacharjee 2011; National Science 
Board 2010) report. One potential explanation for why “bigbang” and “evolved” may not serve 
as good indicators of science literacy is that together with the “condrift” item they are instead 
indicators of a certain belief structure which I term “Young Earth Worldview”. A “young earth” 
worldview (YEW) is one where the Earth is held to be between 5,700 and 10,000 years old 
(Numbers 2006). The prevalence of this view was recorded as variously 47% in 1991 to 53% in 
2006 (Numbers 2006:1) depending on question wording, data from Gallup polls reveal that 
between 43% and 47% believe that human beings were created by God “…pretty much in the 
present form at time within the last 10,000 years or so.” (Keeter and Horowitz 2009). This 
worldview has implications for the survey items included in the YEW dimension. Specifically, 
holders of a young earth worldview will be much more likely to report “false” rather than “true” 
for the evolution question, the big bang question, and potentially the continental drift question.  
Some scholars argue that the “evolved” item should be replaced in future analyses with 
more complex items that assess microvariation, plant evolution, and bacterial and viral mutation 
and evolution (Guterbock 2011; Toumey 2011). While this may better capture nuance in the 
public’s understanding of the concept of evolution, it remains to be seen if such evolution-related 
items differ in their potential conflict with belief in the same way that “evolved” may. If there is 
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a “Young Earth Worldview” then evolution-related items may be as influenced by it as the 
“evolved” item. The debate has largely centered around whether the “evolved” and “bigbang” 
items are of a religious nature in addition to their relation to science knowledge or in lieu of any 
useful relation to science knowledge. The power of confirmatory factor analysis in the SEM 
framework lets me test these assertions. 
2 - Background 
 In a recent review article on public understanding of science (PUS), Bauer et al. (2007) 
discuss how conceptualizations (and thus, methods of study) of PUS have changed since the 
60’s. They document the trend away from examining attitudes about science and education as 
sources of deficit in PUS in the late 1980s, and towards a lack of trust or confidence from the 
1990s on. Jon Miller (1983, 1998, 2004) has defined science literacy as the level of 
understanding needed to “read and comprehend” the science section of The New York Times, 
with the assumption that policy and public discourse will be framed at a similar language level. 
A popular early definition of science literacy or understanding was of three discrete measures: 
consumer science literacy, citizenship science literacy, and general science literacy (Miller 2004; 
Shen 1975) -- and Miller admits that most of his own work has focused on the citizenship aspect 
of science literacy, rather than a professional or practitioner science literacy (i.e. science literacy 
among scientists). 
 Miller has argued that public understanding of science and/or science literacy breaks 
down along two dimensions: “(1) a basic vocabulary of scientific terms and constructs; and (2) a 
general understanding of the nature of scientific inquiry.” (Miller 2004:273). Where (1) is 
essentially a knowledge of facts and terms and (2) is a knowledge of the process of science itself 
- experiment design, parsimony, and the general scientific method. Miller argues that 
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understanding the nature of an experiment is separate from, but not any less important than 
knowledge of general scientific facts and terms. 
 While Miller found that there was an uptick in science literacy from 1988 to 1999 in 
Americans over 18 (from 10% to 17%; see Miller, 2004, p. 288), the overall rate of literacy 
remains low given how many Americans have had basic science courses in higher education and 
high school. The rate at which respondents give what mainstream science would consider correct 
answers to the basic science facts items found in the GSS have been relatively stable in the US 
population since the late 1980s (though the items themselves have not been in the GSS proper), 
save for a steady increase in rate of mainstream science correct answers about antibiotics since 
1988 and an uptick in understanding of DNA since 1997 (Miller 2004; National Science Board 
2010, 2012). The inclusion of these items in a data set as rich and varied as the GSS allows for a 
more nuanced sociological explanation of science understanding and my goal is to suggest 
proper specification of the NSF science knowledge scale in subsequent analyses. 
 The primary contribution of this paper is a measurement model of the NSF science 
knowledge scale. Typically this scale is used as a summed scale -- which doesn’t account for 
either measurement error or for multidimensionality within the scale itself. This work also 
contributes to the debate surrounding the degree to which the “evolved” and “bigbang” items 
present in the NSF science knowledge scale serve as indicators of science knowledge 
(Bhattacharjee 2011; Sherkat 2011:20). The structural equation modeling framework allows for a 
more refined analysis of the individual contribution of items in the NSF science knowledge scale 
(Bollen 1989), and enables the comparison of different model structures with goodness of fit 
statistics in a way exploratory factor analysis (EFA) simply cannot (Hayduk and Glaser 2000).  
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3 - Specific Hypotheses 
 The NSF science knowledge scale is frequently used as a unidimensional construct 
(Gauchat 2010; Sherkat 2011). In this type of model structure the implicit assumption is that the 
latent variable affects each indicator variable equally. Jon Miller proposed a two dimensional 
structure that makes better theoretical sense (1987, 1998, 2004) and should fit the data better.  
This is the structure used in J. H. Evans (2011) and argued for in Bann and Schwerin (2004). 
 
H0:  Underlying the NSF science knowledge scale is a single dimension of science 
knowledge. 
 
H1:  Underlying the NSF science knowledge scale is a two-dimensional latent variable 
for science knowledge, with one dimension for fact-based knowledge and a second 
dimension for methodological knowledge. 
 
 I propose that Miller’s fact-based knowledge dimension (Bann and Schwerin 2004; 
Miller 1998, 2004) may be multidimensional, and that allowing it to break into topical sub 
dimensions will result in better model fit than Miller’s original two dimensional structure, 
specifically letting science literacy indicators load on a physical sciences facts dimension and a 
life sciences facts dimension: 
 
H2:  Underlying the NSF science knowledge scale is a two-dimensional structure that 
breaks sub- dimensions along topical areas of interest, such as life and physical 
sciences. 
 
 Based on the recent debate over the validity of the “evolved” and “bigbang” items as 
measures of science knowledge, I will test whether they load on a religious dimension and if they 
still load on science knowledge dimensions once the religious dimension is accounted for (see 
Figure 1 for this model structure): 
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Figure 1: Science Knowledge from 2006 GSS (Model E). Three dimensions: Life sciences, 
Physical sciences, and Young Earth Worldview 
 
 
H3: Underlying the NSF science knowledge scale is an additional, religious 
dimension that is unrelated to science knowledge. 
 
 To account for the critique that any model structure is merely an effect of the particular 
sample, I split the 2006 wave of the GSS into an exploratory sample and a test sample, and 
further use the 2008 and 2010 waves as well as data from the NSF Surveys dataset (Miller et al. 
2009) for years 1995, 1997, 1999, and 2001 to test model fit. A model that fits well across all 
available samples is likely not merely an effect of a particular sample, nor of overall survey 
design (as data from two different surveys are used, collected in different ways). 
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4 - Data and Methods 
 This paper uses cross-sectional data from the 2006, 2008, and 2010 waves of the General 
Social Survey (GSS), a nationally representative sample of United States adults, and as such can 
be used to make inferences about the US population at large (Davis, Smith, and Marsden 2009; 
Smith et al. 2010). Additional analyses are performed on the National Science Foundation’s 
Surveys of Public Attitudes Toward And Understanding of Science And Technology, which 
consists of earlier cross-sectional samples with the same items now present in the GSS (Miller et 
al. 2009). 
I test the hypotheses above by performing confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) as a case of 
a measurement model within the structural equation models framework (Bollen 1989). SEMs 
cannot prove whether or not a given model is the true model, but they can allow researchers to 
compare different structures and reject poorly fitted models (Bollen 1989; Gideon Schwarz 1978; 
Kline 2005; Raftery 1995). I modeled the dimensions of science knowledge as latent variables. 
In one model, I break science knowledge into Miller’s two subdimensions (fact based knowledge 
and methodological or procedural knowledge) and in other models I adopt structures suggested 
by the above hypotheses. All models were estimated using Mplus 6.12 (Muthén and Muthén 
2011). CFAs allow me to assess overall model fit, the variance explained in the individual items 
by the latent variables, and the extent of measurement error in the individual items. The observed 
variables are the NSF science knowledge scale items from the GSS, which are listed in Table 1 
(Davis et al. 2009; Miller et al. 2009; Smith et al. 2010). These are categorical measures and 
treated as such when estimating the models. 
Due to large sample sizes in the exploratory and test samples, the chi-square statistic is a 
poor indicator of model fit (Bollen 1989; Kline 2005), thus I rely on a number of additional fit 
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indices to assess the overall fit of the model. The additional fit indices include the RMSEA 
(values less than 0.05 indicate good it), the CFI and TLI (values above 0.95 indicate good fit), 
and the Schwarz BIC or SBIC (χ2 - df*nl(N); values less than 0 indicate good fit) (Gideon 
Schwarz 1978; Hu and Bentler 1999; Kline 2005; Tucker and Lewis 1973). The SBIC also can 
be used to compare two models as long as they have the same set of observed variables. A 
difference of 10 or greater indicates a given model has a significantly better fit with the data than 
an alternative model (Raftery 1995). 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics: Number of cases and percent correct for NSF science knowledge 
items in each wave of GSS 
 Wave 2006.1 Wave 2006.2 Wave 2008 Wave 2010 
Variable n % correct n % correct n % correct n % correct 
hotcore 906 78.92% 956 78.14% 1496 82.55% 937 82.39% 
condrift 906 79.36% 956 77.93% 1496 76.74% 938 79.32% 
radioact 907 68.25% 956 70.40% 1495 68.63% 939 66.56% 
earthsun 907 55.35% 956 49.69% 1496 50.53% 939 52.72% 
electron 907 53.58% 956 49.79% 1495 51.64% 936 51.50% 
lasers 907 44.43% 956 44.04% 1494 48.66% 939 46.75% 
evolved 905 42.43% 955 41.36% 1493 44.54% 934 48.07% 
viruses 907 54.91% 956 54.71% 1496 53.41% 939 48.03% 
boyorgrl 907 62.07% 956 64.02% 1244 61.90% 939 61.02% 
expdesgn 908 39.98% 956 40.90% 1487 39.54% 716 49.44% 
odds1 905 86.41% 956 85.15% 1492 82.31% 708 82.63% 
odds2 904 76.88% 956 74.58% 1491 72.37% 707 76.10% 
bigbang 907 32.75% 955 30.68% 1490 32.35% 938 36.78% 
 
5 - Results 
 Model A in Table 3 represents the NSF science knowledge scale as it is frequently used 
within sociology and allied disciplines (Gauchat 2010; Sherkat 2011; Sturgis and Allum 2004) -- 
a mono-dimensional construct -- typically operationalized as a summed scale. When summing 
items into a scale, the implicit assumption is that as the latent variable increases or decreases, 
each indicator increases or decreases the same amount. This can be represented within SEM as 
forcing each factor loading to 1, and this has been done when estimating model A. Overall fit is 
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poor; however, while the SBIC negative (-73.77), the CFI and TLI are both below 0.9, and the 
RMSEA is marginal. 
Table 3: Models estimated with first half of 2006 sample and tested on subsequent samples 
Model n RMSEA CFI TLI χ2 DF SBIC 
Model A 908 0.073 0.848 0.846 450.699 77 -73.77 
Model B 908 0.066 0.898 0.873 315.034 63 -114.07 
Model C 908 0.068 0.893 0.868 325.96 63 -103.15 
Model D 908 0.036 0.971 0.962 132.292 60 -276.38 
Model E 908 0.024 0.988 0.984 90.147 60 -318.53 
Model F 908 0.032 0.977 0.970 116.677 60 -292.00 
Model E replicated  
across all samples 
n RMSEA CFI TLI χ2 DF SBIC 
Model E 1995† 2006 0.028 0.97 0.962 156.264 60 -299.97 
Model E 1997† 2000 0.027 0.973 0.964 146.252 60 -309.80 
Model E 1999† 1882 0.021 0.986 0.981 108.243 60 -344.16 
Model E 2001† 1574 0.024 0.979 0.972 115.945 60 -325.74 
Model E 2006 (1st half) 908 0.024 0.988 0.984 90.147 60 -318.53 
Model E 2006 (2nd half) 956 0.021 0.988 0.985 85.725 60 -326.04 
Model E 20084 1244 0.032 0.974 0.966 138.142 60 -289.42 
Model E 2010 941 0.026 0.984 0.979 98.564 60 -312.25 
Model Legend: A: Unidimensional structure factor loadings forced to 1; B: Miller’s structure, facts and methods 
dimensions; C: Two dimensions, life and physical sciences dimensions; D: Non-Young Earth Worldview dimension 
added to model C, loadings forced to 1; E: Model C with YEW, “evolved” and “bigbang” load on YEW only; F: 
Model B with YEW, “evolved” and “bigbang” load on YEW only. See figure 1 for structural representation of 
Model E. 
†: not from the GSS – from National Science Foundation Surveys of Public Understanding of Science and 
Technology combined dataset, 1979-2006. 1995 was the first year the “expdesgn” and “boyorgrl” items were 
present. (Miller et al, 2009). 
 
                                                
4 The 2008 wave of the GSS alternated the boyorgirl item with a different wording for 
approximately 250 respondents: “Is it the father’s gene that decides whether the baby is a boy or 
a girl. (Is that true or false?)” was the original form, the substituted form, “maboygrl”, was: “It is 
the mother’s gene that decides whether the baby is a boy or a girl.” Different versions of the 
2008 sample were tested, one with the alternate question text missing at the item level, one with 
all cases with the alternate case dropped, and one with the alternate text answers imputed for the 
missing values (keeping the respective correct/incorrect states, as the true/false responses are 
swapped for the different wordings). The model fit changes very little regardless of how the 
missing data is treated. The version with cases dropped is reported above in table 3. 
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Model B in Table 3 is one that conforms to Jon Miller’s (Bann and Schwerin 2004; 
Miller 1983, 1987, 1998, 2004) two dimensions of science knowledge (or what he calls literacy). 
The observed variables do not correspond perfectly to those in his 1998 and 2004 papers, as 
some of the items he used are not present; in particular one of the indicators of methodological 
knowledge (an open-ended explanation of the meaning of studying something scientifically, see 
appendix for a detailed explanation). Model B has the following variables in the methodological 
dimension (SKMeth): “odds1”, “odds2”, and “expdesgn”. Further, the model allows correlated 
errors between the “odds1” and “odds2” items, both of which are questions related to the same 
vignette (see Table 1). Both of these questions rely on an understanding of odds and probability 
as well as a basic understanding of Mendelian genetics, and in the NSF Indicators document as 
well as Miller’s 1998 analysis they are even combined into a single indicator (giving each 
respondent in effect two chances to get it wrong). The model specified correlated error between 
these two items is to account for their interconnectedness in both the survey design and in 
substantive knowledge of genetics and heredity. Model B has a better fit than the unidimensional 
model, with a difference of SBICs of over 40, indicating “very strong support” for B over A 
(Raftery 1995:139), though the Tucker-Lewis index and Comparative fit index are both below 
0.9.  
In model C an alternate structure is tested, where science knowledge consists of two 
dimensions: physical sciences and life sciences. Here, physical sciences items are those items 
that relate to the disciplines of chemistry, physics, or geology, and life sciences items are those 
that relate to genetics, reproduction, and medicine. Physical sciences facts (PFact), was made up 
of the indicators “hotcore”, “condrift”, “earthsun”, “electron”, “radioact”, “bigbang”, and 
“lasers”. Life sciences facts (LSFact) was made up of “odds1”, “odds2”, “expdesgn”, “viruses”, 
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“boyorgrl”, and “evolved”. While the “odds1”, “odds2” and “expdesgn” items are normally 
treated as indicators of methodological knowledge, they each have a life sciences component and 
thus theoretically may group together with the “viruses”, “evolved” and “boyorgrl” items, and an 
empirical comparison of the two structures favors model C over model A, however based on a 
comparison of the SBIC scores, model C does not improve over model B, and the SBIC 
difference of 10.92 is very strong support for B over C. Like model B, model C has poor fit 
statistics other than the SBIC. 
As an initial test for hypothesis 3, separate models for B and C with the following 
correlated errors were estimated but are not reported here. The additional correlated error 
structure is between three items: “bigbang”, “evolved”, and “condrift”. There has been some 
discussion over the inclusion of the “bigbang” item recently, as any question about the origins of 
the universe may tap religious dimensions as well as dimensions of scientific knowledge. The 
question on evolution was dropped from the scale in Sherkat’s analysis (2011) for similar 
reasons (though the Big Bang item was still included), and J. H. Evans (2011) dropped both 
“evolved” and “bigbang” from his analysis. The third item, “condrift” is not scrutinized in the 
same way as either “bigbang” or “evolved”, but I argue here that there is a common thread with 
all three indicators: each may be an indicator of a “Young Earth” worldview -- the belief that the 
Earth is between 5,700 and 10,000 years old (Numbers 2006), and thus that the principle of 
uniformitarianism -- or the idea that the natural processes we see now have always been in place 
-- does not exist. If there is something like a young earth worldview, it would be an essentially 
religious dimension that would also be tapped by these indicators. 
The magnitude of the fit improvement the correlated errors provided, particularly the 
young earth items, coupled with the reduction in relative R2 for the indicators prompted a test of 
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the young earth items as a separate dimension rather than as a correlated error structure (See 
Figure 1). As all three items are coded reverse (that is, high young earth dimensions correspond 
to a zero in the indicators, low young earth worldview to a one), this dimension is titled “Young 
Earth Worldview” (YEW). To make the YEW dimension easier to interpret, the dimension in the 
models is reverse-coded by forcing the factor loading for “evolved” to be negative one rather 
than one. This change does not alter model fit, only the direction of correlations between YEW 
and other dimensions. Thus, a decrease in young earth worldview would increase the likelihood 
of responding correctly (as mainstream science holds) on “condrift”, “bigbang”, or “evolved”. 
Due to the fact that this dimension’s indicators each load on other dimensions, the model where 
the parameters for factor loadings are left free is unidentified (Bollen and Davis 2009; Reilly and 
O’Brien 1996). To mitigate this, model D was estimated with the factor loadings for each path 
from YEW to observed variables forced to one (correlations between dimensions and R2 are in 
Table 4). In this model, however, the paths for the “evolved” indicator factor loading on life 
sciences facts (LSFact) and for the “bigbang” and “condrift” indicator loadings on physical 
sciences facts (PFact) are insignificant.  
To test whether the YEW dimension is indeed a religious one, a model was estimated 
identical to D with the addition of the “bible”5 item as an added indicator for YEW, with 
“condrift”, “evolved”, and “bigbang” factor loadings kept at one, and named D’ (fit statistics in 
                                                
5 The “bible” item was generated from the following question: 
“Which of these statements comes closest to describing your feelings about the Bible?” with 
response categories: (1): The Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally, word for 
word. (2): The Bible is the inspired word of God but not everything in it should be taken literally, 
word for word. (3): The Bible is an ancient book of fables, legends, history, and moral precepts 
recorded by men. (4): Other (Volunteered). Responses of 4 were recoded as missing. (Davis et 
al. 2009; Smith et al. 2010). 
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Appendix). The factor correlations and r2 for this second model can be compared with those from 
model F below, with the same indicators for PFact and LSFact as in model C above. 
Table 4: Comparison of models D and E with the bible variable added 
Factor correlations Model D (SE) D + bib (SE) Model E (SE) E + bib (SE) 
YEW with PFact -0.801 (.079) -0.741 (.047) -0.541  (.045) -0.603  (.039) 
YEW with LSFact -0.606 (.111) -0.533 (.066) -0.305  (.059) -0.380  (.054) 
PFact with LSFact 0.835 (.045) 0.821 (.044) 0.823  (.044) 0.822  (.045) 
R2 Model D (SE) D + bib (SE) Model E (SE) E + bib (SE) 
BIBLE -- -- 0.389 (.042) -- -- 0.484 (.052) 
EXPDESGN 0.303 (.051) 0.307 (.052) 0.307 (.051) 0.307 (.052) 
ODDS1 0.452 (.073) 0.465 (.074) 0.460 (.073) 0.466 (.074) 
ODDS2 0.203 (.048) 0.198 (.048) 0.206 (.049) 0.200 (.048) 
HOTCORE 0.412 (.052) 0.400 (.052) 0.412 (.052) 0.400 (.052) 
RADIOACT 0.524 (.048) 0.539 (.048) 0.524 (.048) 0.537 (.048) 
BOYORGRL 0.121 (.034) 0.119 (.034) 0.122 (.035) 0.120 (.034) 
LASERS 0.525 (.050) 0.529 (.049) 0.526 (.050) 0.527 (.049) 
ELECTRON 0.362 (.045) 0.356 (.045) 0.362 (.045) 0.356 (.044) 
VIRUSES 0.444 (.056) 0.454 (.057) 0.448 (.056) 0.451 (.057) 
BIGBANG 0.489 (.044) 0.502 (.041) 0.588 (.081) 0.517 (.063) 
CONDRIFT 0.605 (.049) 0.613 (.045) 0.387 (.049) 0.418 (.049) 
EVOLVED 0.614 (.067) 0.595 (.044) 0.754 (.093) 0.659 (.063) 
EARTHSUN 0.468 (.047) 0.474 (.047) 0.467 (.047) 0.472 (.047) 
 
What is most striking here is that the factor correlations do not change much with the 
addition of the “bible” item as an anchor for YEW. Further, the r-squares for indicators for the 
overall model do not change a great deal, either. This means that the “bible” indicator did not 
change how YEW behaved overall and suggests that the indicators in YEW are very likely 
tapping a religious dimension -- that of a young earth worldview. 
An attempt to resolve the problem of insignificant paths in model D can be found in 
model E (Table 3). This model removes the most problematic paths, that to “bigbang” from 
PFact and to “evolved” from LSFact, and allows “condrift” to load on both YEW and on PFact, 
as the connection between continental drift and a young earth worldview is likely not as strong as 
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that for evolution or the big bang. In addition, continental drift is obscure enough a concept that 
it may still serve as an indicator for science knowledge, where evolution and the big bang have 
been politicized enough that most US Americans have heard of them regardless of their stance 
on the issue. This change to the model structure makes model E identified even without forcing 
factor loadings to 1, and so all factor loadings are freely estimated. The resulting model fit is 
superior to either models B or C as well as to model D (SBIC = -318.53), and has favorable 
model fit indices. A similar modification was done for Miller’s two dimensional model (Model 
F), and YEW was added with the same paths as above, the SBIC for this model was -292, 
demonstrating a poorer fit than model E. For clarity, the dimensions in model E are PFact or 
physical sciences, LSFact or life sciences facts, and YEW or young earth worldview. The 
indicators for PFact are: “hotcore”, “condrift”, “earthsun”, “electron”, “radioact”, and “lasers”. 
The indicators for LSFact are: of “odds1”, “odds2”, “expdesgn”, “viruses”, and “boyorgrl”; and 
the indicators for YEW are: “condrift”, “evolved”, and “bigbang” (“condrift” loads on both 
YEW and PFact).  
Similar to the test above, a second model was estimated, identical to model E save for the 
addition of the “bible” item -- while E was identified, this was to test if the YEW dimension was 
still as religiously oriented as in model D, with results in Table 4. A similar problem exists in 
measuring economics knowledge: some items intended to measure economics knowledge may 
be answered correctly more often by those leaning left politically, and others may be answered 
correctly more often by those leaning right. In cases where it is difficult to develop sufficient 
“apolitical” questions that adequately tap economics knowledge, items that measure political 
left/right leanings can be included. Then, an additional latent variable can be included in the 
model that represents left/right political leanings. This latent variable would be measured by the 
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self-report item about political leanings, but also would affect those items in the economic 
knowledge scale that are susceptible to influence by these political attitudes. This technique to 
separate the explained variance for indicators that may load on more than one factor requires one 
additional indicator to measure the confounding concept – in this example case left/right political 
leanings. This is similar to the method used to test for religious loading on the indicators that 
make up YEW. 
As was the case with model D, model E and model E’ have similar factor correlations 
and R2 for indicators (a similar analysis was performed for Model F, but not reported here). 
Additionally, this table allows us to see how strong the R2 for the YEW indicators have become -
- “evolved” and “bigbang” are now the two indicators with variance best explained by the model 
(both with and without the “bible” indicator), with “condrift” moving from poor to average. As 
in model D, YEW is negatively correlated with both PFact and LSFact, specifically: as YEW 
decreases likelihood of a respondent selecting what mainstream science holds to be the correct 
answer to the indicators increases. PFact and LSFact remain highly correlated but distinct 
dimensions. The R-square values for indicators in the table represent the explained variance. 
Subtracting these values from 1 yields the measurement error for each indicator for the model 
listed at the top of the table column. 
Test of models on subsequent waves 
One of the strengths of the GSS is that the NSF science knowledge scale is present in 
three recent waves: 2006, 2008, and 2010. The 2006 wave is larger than the others, and was 
randomly split to allow for an exploratory sample and a test sample. This allows for models 
developed to be tested on other samples, and while such a technique may not correct for any 
design bias of the GSS, it will help to alleviate sample bias from any one wave -- if the models 
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are close to the true model, they should work equally well in other waves. Table 3 above 
contains tests of model E, the final model, across all waves (both halves of 2006 as well as 2008 
and 2010), as well as on earlier samples of the science scale (not administered as part of the 
GSS; see (Miller et al. 2009:2)).  
A sensitivity analysis was performed to test if the YEW dimension simply mirrored 
respondents’ religious affiliation (see Appendix). Relations between YEW and other dimensions 
were little changed when adding denominational affiliation as controls, and a multiple group 
analysis between Protestants and others failed to find significant group differences in the 
measurement model. For further sensitivity analyses, see Appendix. 
6 - Discussion 
Young Earth Creationist Worldview 
 The Young Earth Worldview dimension is the most striking result from the models 
above, and requires some additional explanation. The relationship between YEW and the big 
bang item is the most clear -- the statement “The universe began with a huge explosion.”6 is 
more or less directly problematic for a young earth, as a period of expansion and cooling is 
implied by the concept (though perhaps not entirely necessary). It is most likely, however, that 
the big bang as false is packaged into the ongoing rhetoric about a young earth that “young 
earthers” read, hear, and create. Similarly, evolution as generally understood by biologists may 
have some internal disputes, but most tend to agree that whatever the process it tends to happen 
over very long spans of time (even punctuated equilibrium requires large periods of stability), 
and thus evolution as understood by specialists and the lay public is incompatible with a young 
                                                
6 Some scientists have been misrepresented as rejecting the big bang (e.g. Quach, Su, Martin, & 
Greentree, 2012), but it remains the consensus view on the origins of the universe at the time of 
this writing. 
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earth. Further, like the Big Bang, it is likely that the concept of evolution as a “false” theory is 
packaged into rhetoric and ideas about young earth creationism. The continental drift connection 
is weaker -- while the same conceptual problems for plate tectonics within a young earth 
worldview exist, there is more nuance involved and, generally, the idea of the continents moving 
a few centimeters a year is not in itself a problem for a young earth; although coupled with older 
earth ideas and uniformitarianism7, or the idea that the processes we see working in the natural 
world now are the same processes that have been working in antiquity, we might expect that 
holders of a young earth worldview would be more likely to report “false” to the continental drift 
item than others. Because of the obscurity and nuance of the continental drift item, it alone 
remains a good indicator for science knowledge (in particular, physical sciences). 
This does not hold true for “evolved” or “bigbang”, however. These items, most likely 
because of their lack of obscurity, are so commonplace that they make bad indicators of science 
knowledge (indeed, in the models above, insignificant indicators once the YEW dimension is 
accounted for). This is a controversial claim, but the models reported here suggest that “evolved” 
and “bigbang” are better treated as of a specific, religious, worldview -- that of Young Earth 
Creationism. Table 4 demonstrates that the YEW dimension functions almost identically with or 
without the “bible” item included -- an item about the literal truth of the Christian Bible. The 
items “condrift”, “evolved”, and “bigbang” scale together with an item about how literally 
truthful and inerrant the respondent views the Christian Bible. Unlike the NSF science 
                                                
7 Since Lyell, Neocatastrophism has been recognized in geology, or the idea that the gradualism 
of uniformitarianism is supplemented by catastrophic events like earthquakes, volcanoes, 
supernovas, etc. This paradigm fits well with that of punctuated equilibrium.  This is not to be 
confused with the older paradigm of catastrophism or biblical catastrophism, which held that the 
earth was shaped by divine acts. Some Young-Earthers may generally accept the wording of 
“bigbang” as representative of divine catastrophy, and similarly may accept an alternate wording 
of “condrift”. 
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knowledge scale, the “bible” item has been present in the GSS in the current form since 1984 
(Smith et al. 2010), and the percentage of responses in each category has been relatively stable 
with rates for the inerrancy category fluctuating from 32.69-38.39% across waves and from 
30.63-44.79% across age groups. 
Some readers may question the reasoning behind the argument that together the 
“evolved”, “bigbang”, and “condrift” items measure a specific conservative religious worldview 
rather than science knowledge. While it is true that in some cases, individuals who respond with 
incorrect answers on those three items will also be lacking in other areas of science literacy, in 
the United States there is a long tradition of alternative rationalizations for a Young Earth 
Worldview. In some cases, as in that of Baraminology, allowances are made for “micro” 
variation (or, dog breeds, that changing color of moths over generations, etc), but speciation is 
fundamentally rejected8. A Young Earther conversant with the Bariminology “debate” would be 
able to read and understand a New York Times Science Tuesday article on genetics, provided 
that article did not argue for or strongly suggest a speciation event. If it did argue for a speciation 
event, it would be rejected out of hand – regardless of the substantive contents, as it would 
fundamentally conflict with the worldview of the reader in question. Other holders of a Young 
Earth Worldview may hold only a weak or second-hand understanding of the various attempts by 
                                                
8 As one reviewer points out, in some cases speciation is not problematic for modern 
baraminologists, provided this speciation occurs within baramins; that is, no new baramins arise, 
and any variation (micro or otherwise) does not result in either a new kind or in something that is 
not of the original kind. This subtle wordplay can be used to liken baramins to genera, family, or 
even higher order taxons. Further, baraminology generally rejects the idea of universal common 
descent, or that all life derives from a common ancestor. Whether or not the point of contention 
is at speciation events, creation of new genera, or even higher along the standard taxonomic 
hierarchy isn’t particularly relevant, the distinction between theologically important and 
unimportant variation remains. Thus, there are a number of papers published by publications like 
Answers Research Journal that place various members of the genus Australopithecus within the 
same baramin (or holobaramin) as modern humans (eg. Wood, 2010). 
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creation science to rationalize the rejection of uniformitarianism, but may still generally grasp 
such an article. For a lay Young Earther, speciation is complicated; discussing speciation 
involving humans or their ancestors may even be offensive. It is worth noting that a recent PEW 
report put the percentage of creationists in the United States at 46% (Newport 2012); clearly 
more research in this area is necessary to tease apart these distinctions. Further, as one reviewer 
points out there are many Creation Science practitioners with a far more nuanced view of Young 
Earth Creationism than is described here, and to explore these nuanced distintions at depth is 
beyond the scope of this paper (however, see: Brand, 2009; Wood, 2005)  
Assessment of Hypotheses 
 Model B, which is the structure most closely matching Miller’s fact based knowledge and 
methods knowledge dimensions, has better fit than model A -- the unidimensional structure. – 
which initially supports hypothesis 1. Subsequent models improve on the fit with more 
dimensions, lending strong evidence to the claim that the NSF science knowledge scale is not 
best modeled as a single dimension. Thus, I reject hypothesis 0. The implications of the failure of 
hypothesis 0 are that to simply sum the items in the scale into a single science knowledge score 
are at best confusing the difference between physical sciences knowledge and life sciences 
knowledge, or between fact-based knowledge and methodological knowledge, and at worst to 
sum the items as currently presented in the GSS is to include two items that are far better 
indicators of a particular conservative religious worldview than of science knowledge.  
Support for hypothesis 2 is weaker. Model C, two dimensional science knowledge with 
sub-dimensions for life sciences and physical sciences has better fit than model A, but the SBIC 
difference has weak support for model B over model C. However, once proper accounting for the 
religious nature of the “evolved” and “bigbang” items is made, a variation of model C (model E) 
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has better fit than a similarly modified model B (model F), lending support for hypothesis 2 (see 
appendix for more detail). 
Hypothesis 3 is supported with these analyses. In a naïve model, “evolved” and 
“bigbang” load on life and physical sciences, respectively, but once the young earth worldview 
dimension is specified, neither loads significantly on either dimension. Model E has much better 
fit than models B or C (SBIC differences of 204.46 and 215.38, respectively), indicating very 
strong support for model E. Further, model E is superior to model D -- the model that forces 
“evolved” and “bigbang” to load on science knowledge as well as young earth worldview. This 
is the crux of the claim that “evolved” and “bigbang” are not indicators of science knowledge, 
but rather of Young Earth Creationist worldview. Further, the reversal of model preference 
between Miller’s two dimensional structure and the structure presented in model C above (with 
life and physical sciences sub dimensions) once Young Earth Worldview is taken into account is 
evidence of how treating “evolved” and “bigbang” as indicators of science knowledge may 
confound results. 
Table 3 demonstrates good fit for model E across all subsequent waves (as well as the 
second half of the 2006 wave). This lends evidence to the claim that the model structure is not 
merely an artifact of the sample, though it may still be an artifact of the overall survey design of 
the GSS. The scale was administered outside the GSS for years 1995, 1997, 1999, and 2001, and 
model E has excellent fit in these samples as well, which lends support to the claim that the 
structure is neither an artifact of the sample nor an artifact of the GSS survey design. 
Recommendations 
 It should be noted here that any scale is constructed from an essentially arbitrary set of 
items, and the items used in the analyses above are not necessarily representative of the entirety 
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of science literacy (indeed, it is unlikely that they are). However, Based on these analyses 
researchers unable or unwilling to make use of the NSF science scale within the structural 
equation modeling framework should take special care to account for the religious loading of the 
“evolved” and “bigbang” items (and to a lesser extent, “condrift”). While further research is 
needed in this area, these results suggest the possibility that “evolved” and “bigbang” measure 
very little in the way of science knowledge, and instead may be primarily measures of a specific 
religious worldview (that is correlated with science knowledge), in samples of US Americans.  
Knowledge of natural history is a part of science knowledge, but what is the issue here is using 
two of the most controversial and emotionally charged potential items to measure it.  Young 
Earth Worldview is, at its core, a worldview. Those that hold it are operating under a different 
paradigm than most others, a paradigm in which speciation ultimately leading to new high level 
taxons and beneficial gene mutation (resulting from new genetic information) are theological 
impossibilities9. To the extent that those holding this view may or may not have reduced science 
literacy, it may be best to assess this in areas that are not in direct ideological conflict with their 
views on the origins of life or the universe (indeed, we can already guess their views in those 
areas). 
                                                
9 There are some spirited defenses of Intelligent Design with regard to antibiotic-resistant 
bacteria. The key arguments here center around either the genes leading to antibiotic resistance 
being already extant or the resistance being the result of loss of information rather than “new 
genes”. While a detailed analysis of these arguments is beyond the scope of this paper, it should 
be noted that the forms of mutation accepted by those in the ID movement are very limited, and 
in general they reject the processes that lead to speciation. Indeed, in a paper by (Anderson and 
Purdom 2008), they specifically argue that so-called “beneficial mutations” work by disabling or 
deleting other systems and frequently lead to deficiencies later, and more specifically they argue 
that mutations fit into a model where: “biological systems and functions were fully formed at 
creation,”. 
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Further, it is advisable that if creating summed scales researchers create two separate scales: one 
for life sciences knowledge and one for physical sciences knowledge, rather than one single 
summed scale.  
 Many researchers currently using the NSF items construct summed scales -- this is 
problematic because it packages measurement error into the scale, conflates physical and life 
sciences fact based knowledge, and may even package some portion of particular conservative 
religious beliefs into the scale (which would almost certainly confound any bivariate relationship 
between science knowledge and religiosity). Grouping the NSF science knowledge scale into life 
and physical sciences rather than fact based and methods based knowledge is a better 
representation of the data when using the available indicators. However, this will not alleviate 
the problem of measurement error within the subscales, which may confound analyses using the 
scales as covariates. Going forward, conservative religious beliefs should be included as a 
covariate when estimating models that predict science knowledge, whether or not the researcher 
conceptualizes YEW as a religious dimension or as degree of knowledge about natural history. 
 Further work is needed to examine how “evolved” and “bigbang” may load differently in 
samples from outside the United States. Additionally, the analyses above suggest that 
methodological knowledge about science may not be well measured by the NSF scale at all. 
Some readers may still prefer to consider a rejection of uniformitarianism to be a problem of 
science literacy, regardless of the motivation for that rejection (religious or otherwise). 
Additional items that are intended to tap the Young Earth Worldview and/or Natural History 
constructs while avoiding the most contentious issues may provide a better way to deal with this 
conceptual problem.  
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CHAPTER III: CONTESTED KNOWLEDGE: COMPETING TRUTH CLAIMS AT 
THE INTERSECTION OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION 
 
1 - Introduction 
 Knowledge may be said to be contested when multiple claims to truth exist – that is, one 
set of reasons why a particular piece of knowledge is legitimate and one or more set of reasons 
why it is illegitimate. In the United States, the theory of evolution and related ideas has been 
under contest in the public imagination since before the Scopes Trial, and remains contested to 
this day. The sources for this contestation are from the scientific and religious spheres. The 
problem area of knowledge is that of the origins of life, life’s complexity, and the beginnings of 
the universe (origins henceforth). The theory of evolution (and related ideas) is the set of 
explanations that has greatest legitimacy from the scientific sphere; competing ideas such as 
forms of creationism and intelligent design hold greatest legitimacy from the religious sphere. 
 There has been some scholarship detailing how, generally, the scientific and religious 
spheres are not in conflict, at least on epistemological grounds (Ecklund 2010; Evans and Evans 
2008). However, these scholars still acknowledge that in certain specific areas of overlap 
between science and religion, contestation or “epistemic conflict” (Evans and Evans 2008) 
exists. I argue in this article that contested knowledge areas serve to define the nature of the 
intersections between spheres of knowledge authority, and moreover that positions within a 
contested knowledge area can lead to a negative assessment of the opposed sphere spilling over 
into uncontested areas of knowledge (or, uncontested areas must be wrong by association). 
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 A number of recent studies have addressed the conflict (or lack thereof) between science 
and religion in American life (Baker 2012; Ecklund and Park 2009; Evans and Evans 2008; 
Evans 2011; Longest and Smith 2011; Roos 2012; Sherkat 2011). Typically, this new vein of 
work either explores the concrete epistemological incongruences between science and religion or 
instead the extent of the public belief and discourse about the conflict itself. These examinations 
raise the question of the intersection between the spheres of science and religion as a potential 
battleground for the legitimization of knowledge (Berger and Luckmann 1967). Gordon Gauchat 
(Gauchat 2010, 2012) has theorized that science has a “legitimacy problem” in the United States: 
which he defines as a scenario where “…the public no longer looks to scientists and scientific 
knowledge to provide a set of values that would improve everyday life, enlighten political 
perspectives, or address moral issues…” (Gauchat 2010:2), which could indicate a weakening of 
the influence of the scientific sphere. With the growing number of highly controversial science 
policy related issues at the forefront of the political scene in American politics (science 
education, science funding, and the STEM workforce), just how knowledgeable the American 
public tends to be about those sorts of issues becomes even more important. 
 This article tests the effects of conservative Protestant religious affiliation on contested 
knowledge of origins and uncontested knowledge in general science (Roos 2012). It then 
compares these findings to those of recent works that fail to tease apart contested from 
uncontested knowledge, and demonstrates how, when properly specified, specific religious 
affiliations can have negative effects on even uncontested science knowledge, both directly and 
indirectly. In the following sections, I provide a brief discussion of the particular case of 
contested knowledge (origins), scholarship on religion and science, and the public understanding 
of science. This discussion is followed by an explanation of the knowledge of origins dimension 
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in greater detail, a listing and explanation of specific research questions, and a section describing 
the data and methods used. This paper will demonstrate evidence of a direct negative effect of a 
contested knowledge area on uncontested science knowledge as well as indirect negative effects 
of conservative Protestant affiliation on science knowledge. 
2 - Background 
Public Understanding of Science  
 Science, once termed “natural philosophy” and considered a branch of philosophy, may 
be thought of as an empirical system of study. Thus, science knowledge is best conceived as 
knowledge about the substantive results and processes that occur during “normal science” (Kuhn 
1962). For the purposes of this article, science is defined as: the intellectual and practical 
activity encompassing the systematic study of the structure and behavior of the physical and 
natural world through observation and experiment (Oxford Dictionaries 2013). Scholars of 
science point out that it is difficult to disentangle the methods of science, the practitioners of 
those methods, and the product of those methods (Gieryn 1999; Moore 2008); however, this 
paper will focus on the product of those methods. And, for the purposes of this article, I shall 
define science knowledge as follows: The knowledge required to read and understand the 
science section or science-focused articles of a newspaper or news website, such as npr.org or 
cnn.com, allowing for topical areas of specialization (Roos 2012). This definition is necessarily 
multi-dimensional, as it requires the understanding of the methods and process of science as well 
as some basic textbook-level facts related to specific scientific topic areas. This definition is 
similar to the two-dimensional definition proposed by Miller (Miller 1983, 1987, 1998, 2004). 
The National Academy of Sciences Center for Science, Mathematics, and Engineering Education 
has defined science literacy as the ability to: 
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[A]sk, find, or determine answers to questions derived from curiosity about everyday 
experiences. It means that a person has the ability to describe, explain, and predict natural 
phenomena. Scientific literacy entails being able to read with understanding articles about 
science in the popular press and to engage in social conversation about the validity of the 
conclusions. (National Academy of Sciences, Center for Science, Mathematics and 
Education 1996:22).  
 
They go on to stress the importance of evaluation of evidence and the ability to make and 
evaluate arguments, essentially combining Miller’s two dimensions. Previous analyses (Roos 
2012) have shown that topical subject area dimensions, namely physical and life sciences 
underlie the NSF science knowledge scale10 and have a significantly better fit to the data than 
Miller’s proposed structure, and further suggest that the NSF science knowledge scale poorly 
measures methodological knowledge about science, if at all. 
 Past work on disparities in science knowledge has focused on sex, age, college science 
instruction, number of children present in the home, educational attainment, and “informal 
learning”, or a measure of the use of “informal science education resources” as predictors (Miller 
2004:288–289), and more recent work has begun to look at religion (Evans 2011; Gauchat 2010; 
Roos 2012, 2013; Sherkat 2011). The rate at which respondents give what mainstream science 
holds to be correct answers to the basic science facts items found in the GSS have been relatively 
stable in the US population since the late 1980’s, save for a steady increase in rate of correct 
answers about antibiotics since 1988 and about DNA since 1997 (Miller 2004; National Science 
Board 2010, 2012). However, the Big Bang and Evolution questions have been regarded as 
controversial (Bhattacharjee 2011), and I argue they are measures of an additional dimension, 
described below. 
                                                
10 Unfortunately, the social and behavioral sciences are routinely excluded from many 
instruments that measure science literacy, including the NSF scale. 
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Science and Religion 
 Ecklund and Scheitle argue that the intersection between science and religion is 
“paramount in the public imagination” (Ecklund and Scheitle 2007:289). The understanding of 
religion and science as being at war in the minds of the general public has been called into 
question recently (Ecklund and Park 2009; Evans and Evans 2008; Longest and Smith 2011). 
Evans and Evans argue that most writing about science and religion frames the interaction in 
terms of a “war” between science and religion (Evans and Evans 2008:88) or what they call the 
“epistemological conflict” narrative, and that this framing is both unfair and inaccurate. 
However, recent work by both Ecklund and Park (Ecklund and Park 2009) and by Longest and 
Smith (2011) shows that in some members of both scientists and the general public science and 
religion are still seen as at odds. (Evans and Evans 2008)argue that when there is conflict 
between religion and science it is related to specific definitions of both religion and science 
(2008:88). It is these areas of overlap in definition, meaning, and legitimate knowledge between 
the two spheres of science and religion that are contested knowledge areas; the most visible of 
these areas is origins. 
 Two recent studies have examined religion and science knowledge in the United States 
with contrasting results; one study found evidence for a negative association between 
conservative Protestantism and science knowledge (Sherkat 2011), another found that once 
“contested facts” were separated from science knowledge, practicing fundamentalist Protestants 
knew no less science knowledge than infrequent religious attenders, net of controls (Evans 
2011). These results differ in part for reasons of measurement - how religious traditions and 
beliefs are coded can bias results, and how scientific knowledge is coded and scaled has similar 
effects. In one of these two studies, Sherkat chose to avoid the use of one indicator of contested 
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knowledge of origins (about human evolution, see Table 1 for item text), but retained questions 
about the big bang and continental drift. Additionally, Sherkat chose to use the biblical literalism 
item in the General Social Survey (GSS) as an exogenous control. As Roos (Roos 2012) 
demonstrates, the GSS biblical literalism measure loads significantly with some items that make 
up the science knowledge scale, thus including it as an exogenous control while including one or 
more of these indicators as part of the scale may bias results. 
 Evans (Evans 2011) used a modification of the religious tradition (RELTRAD; short for 
RELigious TRADition) coding scheme (Steensland et al. 2000; Woodberry et al. 2012), and as 
additional steps he separated fundamentalist Protestants from evangelicals and conservative 
Catholics from other Catholics, and further included only those that frequently attend religious 
services in these groups. Evans also used a two-scale scheme to code scientific knowledge – one 
that more closely approximates the work of Jon Miller (Miller 1983, 1987, 1998, 2004). 
Additionally, he chose to group two of the most contested knowledge items (on evolution and the 
big bang) apart from uncontested items rather than to include them. Evans found that there were 
significant effects for certain religious traditions on knowledge of what Evans termed “contested 
‘facts’” (Evans 2011:720), and found that all religious traditions save for non-conservative 
Catholics scored low on contested facts. He went on to suggest from this that mainline 
Protestants may “not agree with mainstream scientific epistemology” (Evans 2011:721). This 
finding raises the question: do those members of various religious traditions that reject 
mainstream science explanations for origins also hold lower levels of science knowledge? 
 The recent work by Elaine Ecklund and colleagues has shown that among some 
practitioners, the conflict between religion and science is muted, if present at all (Ecklund and 
Park 2009; Ecklund and Scheitle 2007; Ecklund 2010). In work by others, the link between 
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conservative forms of Protestantism and educational attainment is traditionally seen as negative 
(Darnell and Sherkat 1997; Lehrer 1999; Sherkat and Darnell 1999; Sherkat and Ellison 1999), 
and while there is some evidence of a negative perception of science among conservative 
Protestants for moral reasons (Ellison and Musick 1995), it does not follow that conservative 
Protestants avoid greater levels of educational attainment for these reasons (Beyerlein 2004; 
Evans 2011). Situated in these literatures, the relationship between conservative Protestantism 
and science knowledge remains a murky issue. 
Contested Knowledge 
 When more than one set of heuristics for judging the accuracy, legitimacy, and value of 
certain knowledges applies, that area of knowledge may be said to be contested. Not all 
contested knowledges remain so indefinitely – Plate Tectonics was once a very controversial set 
of ideas, yet is now considered part of the mainstream in Geology. Other knowledges are 
uncontested: that the center of the Earth is very hot is part of a set of ideas that is uncontroversial 
in the present day. Similarly, that the Moon (and the Sun and Jupiter) cause the oceanic tides is 
uncontroversial and thus uncontested (although perhaps obscure). Additionally, a fact that many 
misunderstand is not necessarily an example of contested knowledge.  In the case of the cause of 
the seasons on Earth, it is the angle of light rather than change in distance from the Sun that 
causes seasons. This fact is not contested, it is merely obscure. 
 Sociologists and historians of knowledge historically have pointed out both the plurality 
and the contextual nature of specific knowledges (Burke 2000; Foucault 1995; Mannheim 1936; 
Merton 1968), but only rarely have they treated contested areas of knowledge. Contested areas of 
knowledge are specific areas of knowledge where multiple competing truth claims vie for 
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legitimacy (Berger and Luckmann 1967; Bourdieu 1984) – approaching, but not necessarily 
reaching the point of competing Weltanschauungen (or worldviews).  
 A focus on contested areas of knowledge is inherently cultural. However, unlike the 
struggles for power within a field (Bourdieu 1984), a contested knowledge area is the space 
where two otherwise orthogonal fields intersect, and there the logic of power struggles within 
either field breaks down. With the recognition of the unique nature of contested knowledge areas 
comes the realization that to talk of “conflict” in uncontested areas is erroneous (Evans and 
Evans 2008); for example, there is no “versus” between science and religion in understandings of 
the process of photosynthesis or convection. The source of the conflict, if it exists, is in contested 
areas of knowledge, no matter the narrative elsewhere. 
 For many adults, “what they know” is as much about their concept of self as it is about 
their acquisition and recall of specific knowledge. Because of this, the negative effect the 
rejection of mainstream science explanations for origins may have on uncontested forms of 
science knowledge can be considered as a form of boundary work (Gieryn 1983), although in 
this case the judgment is not what is science and what is not, but rather which forms and sources 
of knowledge are legitimate and which are not. If the chief source of legitimacy for one set of 
fact based science knowledge is the same as that for a rejected set of knowledge (in this case, 
origins), then the authority and veracity of that knowledge is suspect. Further, the demarcation 
between accepted and unaccepted knowledge is akin to identity-based boundary work (Lamont 
and Molnár 2002; Lamont 1992) or identity work (Snow and Anderson 1987). Thus the negative 
influence that rejecting mainstream science explanations for origins may have on uncontested 
knowledge is not simply one of lack of understanding, but is instead spillover from the work of 
demarcating what is and is not legitimate knowledge. Individuals from either sphere live in a 
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“world of meanings” (Mannheim 1993a:405), however within a contested knowledge area those 
meanings are wholly incommensurate. 
Spillover 
 As Kuhn (1962) famously argued, the scientific production of knowledge is not a steady 
process. It is at times contentious, and when multiple paradigms (or symbolic universes (Berger 
and Luckmann 1967)) intersect, it may not be obvious to an outsider which of the competing set 
of rules, values, and relationships is the most applicable. However, in cases of contested 
knowledge, we are few of us true outsiders. For those that hold a position in a contested 
knowledge area (the acceptance or rejection of evolution, for example), the idea that the opposed 
sphere is incorrect in this area. If I accept the theory of evolution and related ideas, I likely 
consider creationism and intelligent design to be incorrect attempts to explain the problem of 
origins. Spillover is when this assessment of the legitimacy or veracity of the opposed sphere’s 
explanation in a contested area is also applied to the uncontested knowledge from the opposed 
sphere. 
 Thus, spillover results in adherents to one set of truth claims in a contested knowledge 
area devaluing or rejecting uncontested knowledge from the opposed sphere in the contested 
area. This spillover can be found in work such as The God Delusion (Dawkins 2006), where 
Richard Dawkins argues the falseness of religion based on scientific standards for knowledge 
(neglecting that some questions are likely unanswerable by science). It is this competition for 
legitimacy that structures a contested knowledge area – the more acrimonious the competition, 
the more that uncontested knowledge outside the contested area can be viewed as an ideology 
(Mannheim 1936:40, 1993b) held by those with dissenting views within the contested area.  
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 Evidence for spillover effects might be an association between the rejection of evolution 
and related ideas and reduced uncontested forms of science knowledge. To identify this type of 
association, first a measure for positions within a contested knowledge area is required. 
Particular positions within the contested area of origins are described in more detail in the next 
subsection. 
Rejection of Scientific Orthodoxy (RSO) 
 First introduced in (Roos 2012), religiously-motivated rejection of scientific orthodoxy 
(RSO) is a specific orientation within the contested knowledge area of origins. It entails the 
rejection (generally for religious reasons) of mainstream, orthodox scientific explanations of the 
beginnings of the universe, the first spark of life, and the variation of life over the millennia 
since. For those that reject scientific orthodox explanations for origins, the concept of humans 
evolving from earlier life forms is false despite the average holder of RSO being aware of the 
concept and further being aware that most scientists hold evolution in high regard. By 
association, other ideas related to uniformitarianism or geological gradualism, such as 
continental drift or even the big bang (the former points to an ancient Earth, the latter to an even 
more ancient universe) are also considered false. As an ideology, RSO aligns with the goals of 
those working to bring Intelligent Design (ID) into school curricula, and with young and old 
earth creationists (Degler 1992; Forrest and Gross 2004; Numbers 1982, 2006; Pennock 2003, 
2010; Sober 2007). Defined as a rejection of orthodox science explanations, it does not rise to the 
level of weltanschauung, though aligned within RSO are several worldviews that reject 
mainstream science on evolution and the origins of the earth. 
 It is important to point out that the RSO perspective is not isomorphic with conservative 
Protestantism. While there is some degree of overlap, both in ideologies and in persons that hold 
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RSO strongly while also being conservative Protestants, individuals who would not be typically 
placed in the conservative Protestant category may also hold RSO strongly – in the 2006-2012 
waves of the GSS this includes some Catholics, members of other Protestant traditions, and 
others. RSO is a construct representing rejection of specific truth claims about the world, and it 
should come as no surprise that such a dimension does not map perfectly onto categories like 
religious denomination. 
 A recent Gallup poll found that nearly half (46%) of US citizens reject mainstream 
science accounts of human origins (Newport 2012), responding that they believe that humans 
were created in their current form within the last 10,000 years11. This proportion has been stable 
since Gallup first started asking the question in 1982. Gallup further disaggregates those that 
hold evolutionist views into theistic evolutionists (or those that hold that humans evolved from 
earlier forms with God’s help) and secular evolutionists. While those that hold a secular 
evolutionist view has increased slightly in the most recent samples, this increase is from a 
reduction in those that hold theistic evolution, not from those that hold a creationist account. 
Gallup finds that more religious people tend to hold creationist accounts, though the report only 
looked at religious attendance as a measure for religiosity. 
 A question similar to that asked by Gallup can be found in the Survey of Public Attitudes 
and Understanding of Science and Technology (National Science Board 2012) included since 
                                                
11 Question wording and response categories (Newport 2012): “Which of the following 
statements comes closest to your views on the origin and development of human beings? 
(1) Human beings have developed over millions of years from less advanced forms of 
life, but God has guided this progress,  
(2) Human beings have developed over millions of years from less advanced forms of 
life, but God had no part in this process,  
(3) God created human beings pretty much in their present form at one time within the 
last 10,000 years or so.” 
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2006 in the GSS  (see Table 1 for question wording). Recently, some have used the scale (and a 
similar scale that is only present in the 2008 GSS) to delineate the conflict, if any, between 
religion and science in the minds and hearts of US citizens (Evans 2011; Sherkat 2011), and 
there has been some disagreement about how best to deal with the evolution survey item (as well 
as another item about the big bang) as they may tap religious beliefs in addition to science 
knowledge. I have argued elsewhere (Roos 2012) that these survey items not only measure 
specific, conservative religious beliefs, but that they may not measure particular science 
knowledge in any meaningful way. Rather, they are indicators for a specific, religiously-
motivated perspective: RSO. Holders of RSO may be young earth creationists (Numbers 2006), 
old earth creationists, or they may reject mainstream science explanations for the origins and 
variation of life and the origin of the universe for other reasons. 
 This perspective has necessary implications for the survey items included in the RSO 
dimension. Specifically, those that reject orthodox explanations of origins will be much more 
likely to report “false” rather than “true” for the evolution question, the big bang question, and 
potentially even the continental drift question. These questions are part of the NSF science 
literacy scale, and have the following wordings: “Human beings, as we know them today, 
developed from earlier species of animals” (human evolution) “The universe began with a huge 
explosion” (the Big Bang), “The continents on which we live have been moving their locations 
for millions of years and will continue to move in the future” (continental drift/plate tectonics); 
see Table 1 for more detail about these items. In a recent paper, Roos found that these items not 
only loaded on a religious dimension (Roos 2012), but that the “evolved” and “bigbang” items 
loaded only on this dimension, and were poor indicators of science knowledge. This stood as 
strong evidence supporting the existence of what Roos termed Young Earth Worldview as a 
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religious dimension correlated with (but not a part of) science knowledge. The items that 
measure RSO are likely tapping a broader concept than just young earth creationism, and that 
others may reject orthodox scientific explanations for origins without accepting the young earth 
creationist account. Given this formulation of RSO, a set of specific questions arises about the 
relations between RSO, conservative Protestantism, and uncontested science knowledge. 
3 - Specific Research Questions 
 The first set of questions to be tested in this article come from recent research on the 
intersection of science and religion in the general public. One argument is that, because religion 
is learned at the youngest ages, and because certain conservative forms of Protestantism devalue 
knowledge generally and alternate sources of knowledge authority specifically (Ecklund 2010; 
Peshkin 1986; Sherkat and Darnell 1999; Sherkat 2011), those raised in those conservative 
traditions may be less likely to have interest in or to seek out scientific knowledge. Additionally, 
the public (and academic) perception remains that science is epistemologically incompatible with 
western religions (Ecklund 2010; Ellison and Musick 1995), and therefore those inculcated into 
religion at an early age may find science knowledge to conflict with other, accepted forms of 
knowledge.  
 However, based on the analytical distinction between contested and uncontested 
knowledge discussed above, we may expect conservative Protestant religious traditions to have 
no significant effect on science knowledge once RSO is accounted for. In non-contested areas of 
science, there are unlikely to be competing truth claims between the science and religious 
spheres (Ecklund 2010; Evans and Evans 2008; Evans 2011). Additionally, because any negative 
effect that holding RSO strongly might have on other forms of science knowledge would be 
independent of the religious tradition a person was raised into, it is unlikely that even the more 
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conservative Protestant religious traditions would have a significant effect on uncontested 
science knowledge, particularly once educational attainment is also controlled for (Beyerlein 
2004; Evans and Evans 2008). These arguments lead to the following question: 
Q1: Do conservative forms of Protestantism lead to reduced science knowledge? 
 
 A closely related set of arguments holds for RSO. Based on the arguments above, we 
might expect conservative Protestant religious traditions to lead to rejecting orthodox scientific 
explanations of origins more strongly. If evolution and origins is a contested area of knowledge, 
then individuals, layperson and expert alike, must navigate the competing truth claims about the 
world. Being raised within conservative Protestant religious traditions may serve to “anchor” the 
religious truth claim in minds, making them more likely to hold increased RSO, even net of 
educational attainment. The set of meanings by which scientific knowledge is legitimated 
conflicts with those by which religious knowledge is legitimated within the contested knowledge 
area. Exposure to the religious sphere first may predispose one to reject scientific explanations of 
origins. These arguments lead to the following question: 
Q2: Does identifying as conservative Protestant lead to increased rejection of 
scientific orthodoxy (RSO) with respect to origins? 
 
 As individuals negotiate the specifics regarding their religious identity and the related 
forms of legitimate knowledge, there may be some spillover effect on other, uncontested forms 
of knowledge when there is a contested knowledge area, as in the case of origins. In these cases, 
individuals may wish to state clearly what they are not: if they are not the sort of person that 
agrees with mainstream science accounts of evolution, for example, then other things that 
mainstream science claims to be true are suspect (Gieryn 1983; Lamont 1992; Snow and 
Anderson 1987). In this case, it is not that persons that hold RSO are not aware of uncontested 
forms of science knowledge so much that they reject contested knowledge so strongly that they 
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reject some uncontested knowledge, too. These arguments about spillover lead to the following 
question: 
Q3: Does the rejection of scientific orthodoxy with respect to origins influence  
uncontested forms of science knowledge?  
 
4 - Data and Methods 
Data 
 This paper uses cross-sectional data from the GSS, a nationally representative sample of 
United States adults, and as such can be used to make inferences about the US adult population 
at large (Davis et al. 2009; Smith et al. 2010). The indicators for RSO are present in the 2006, 
2008, 2010, and 2012 waves of the GSS and this makes the GSS the ideal choice for these 
analyses. The GSS began in 1972 with representative samples of the United States yearly or bi-
yearly since. The GSS consists of a core of demographic and social variables with various topical 
modules added; such as the science knowledge and religion items used in the following papers 
(Davis et al. 2009; Smith et al. 2010). The GSS is an ideal source of data for this project because 
of the inclusion of both the indicators for RSO and a variety of other religiosity items. Due to the 
split-sample design of the GSS since 1993, sample sizes for the models below vary (Smith et al. 
2010).  
Outcome Variables 
 RSO is measured by the responses to the following three questions: “Human beings, as 
we know them today, developed from earlier species of animals. (Is that true or false?)”; “The 
universe began with a huge explosion. (Is that true or false?)”; and “The continents on which we 
live have been moving their locations for millions of years and will continue to move in the 
future. (Is that true or false?)”. These represent responses to questions about human evolution, 
whether or not the universe began with an explosion, and whether or not the continents move, 
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respectively. In Roos’ analysis (Roos 2012), the continental drift item loaded on both RSO and 
Physical sciences knowledge, and so it was allowed to load on both dimensions here. The full 
model reported here was replicated without that item in the model, with similar results. In Roos 
(Roos 2012), an additional item about biblical literalism was included, however for clarity it is 
not included here. When it is included as an indicator of RSO, results are similar. 
  PFact or Physical sciences fact-based knowledge is measured by the responses to the 
following questions: “First, the center of the Earth is very hot. Is that true or false?”; “The 
continents on which we live have been moving their locations for millions of years and will 
continue to move in the future. (Is that true or false?)”; “Now, does the Earth go around the Sun, 
or does the Sun go around the Earth?” coupled with the question “How long does it take for the 
Earth to go around the Sun: one day, one month, or one year?”; “Electrons are smaller than 
atoms. (Is that true or false?)”; “All radioactivity is man-made. (Is that true or false?)”; and 
“Lasers work by focusing sound waves. (Is that true or false?)”. These represent the responses to 
questions about how hot the Earth’s core is, whether or not continents move (this item loads on 
both RSO and PFact), whether the Earth moves around the Sun or the Sun around the Earth, 
whether an electron is larger or smaller than an atom, if all radioactivity is man-made, and if 
lasers are made up of compressed sound waves. 
 LSFact or Life sciences fact-based knowledge is measured by true/false questions as well 
as two vignettes. Two questions in response to the following vignette:  
“Now, think about this situation. A doctor tells a couple that their genetic makeup means 
that they’ve got one in four chances of having a child with an inherited illness. (Answers 
took the form: Yes, No, or Don’t Know)” 
  
With the first question being “Does this mean that if their first child has the illness, the next three 
will not have the illness?” and the second being “Does this mean that each of the couple’s 
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children will have the same risk of suffering from the illness?”. A third question relates to the 
following vignette:  
“Now, please think about this situation. Two scientists want to know if a certain drug is 
effective against high blood pressure. The first scientist wants to give the drug to one 
thousand people with high blood pressure and see how many of them experience lower 
blood pressure levels. The second scientist wants to give the drug to five hundred people 
with high blood pressure, and not give the drug to another five hundred people with high 
blood pressure, and see how many in both groups experience lower blood pressure 
levels.” 
 
With three response categories: “All 1000 get the drug”; “500 get the drug; 500 don’t”; and 
“Don’t know”. Remaining indicators for LSFact are responses to the following questions: 
“Antibiotics kill viruses as well as bacteria. (Is that true or false?)”; and “It is the father’s gene 
that decides whether the baby is a boy or a girl. (Is that true or false?)”. These represent the 
responses to two questions about parents transmitting a genetic illness to their offspring, 
experimental design for a drug trial, how antibiotics affect viruses, and whether the genetic 
material to determine sex comes from an individual’s biological father or mother. See Table 1 in 
appendix for precise question wording for all indicators. 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics for RSO indicators 
  Wave 2006 Wave 2008 Wave 2010 Wave 2012 
Variable n % correct†† n % correct n % correct n % correct 
evolved 1860 41.88% 1493 44.54% 934 48.07% 510† 47.65% 
bigbang 1862 31.69% 1490 32.35% 938 36.78% 514† 37.94% 
condrift 1862 78.63% 1496 76.74% 938 79.32% 996 81.53% 
See Table 1 for item wording 
†: Roughly half of respondents received alternate question wordings for the evolution and big bang questions for the 
2012 wave of the GSS, those items are not included in these analyses. See appendix for a comparison of the new 
question wordings. 
††: Percentage that selected the answer that most reflects the mainstream science consensus. 
 
Intervening Variables 
 Intervening variables in the full model, or variables placed causally between exogenous 
control variables and outcome variables are education in years and number of college science 
courses taken. Respondent education is represented by a variable constructed from a series of 
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questions about the respondents education, and is measured in years. Jon Miller and others 
(Miller, Pardo, and Niwa 1997) found that number of college science courses taken was a 
significant predictor of science knowledge, and here number of college science courses taken is 
created by combining the responses to the questions “Have you ever taken any college-level 
science courses” (response categories were “yes”, “no”, and “don’t know”) and “How many 
college-level science courses have you taken?” (responses ranged from 1 to 90) from the GSS, 
recoding the second variable to be zero rather than missing when respondents indicate that they 
have not taken any college level science courses from the first item. The new item ranges from 0-
90, with a mean of 2.66, median of 0 and a skewness of 5.25, and this was concatenated to a 10 
category ordinal variable for ease of analysis and interpretation, as few respondents reported 
more than 9 science courses taken. The new ordinal variable for number of college science 
courses taken has a median of 0, mean of 1.67 and a skewness of 1.69, and it is treated as a 
continuous variable12. 
Exogenous Variables 
 Exogenous variables in the full model include religious tradition, years of parent’s 
education, age, race, and frequency of religious attendance. J. H. Evans argued that infrequent 
attenders may be less like frequent attending members of various religious traditions (2011), and 
my inclusion of frequency of religious attendance as an exogenous variable serves in part to 
control and allow for this effect. Religious attendance is measured by the response to the 
question “How often do you attend religious services?” from the GSS, with response categories 
                                                
12 For sensitivity, the analyses below were also run with number of college science courses taken 
variable replaced with the natural log of the non-concatenated variable, with similar results. The 
collapsed version is reported for ease of interpretation, as the proportion of cases with greater 
than nine college science courses is very small (less than 4%). The collapsed variable allows the 
coefficient to be interpreted in terms of more or less actual science courses. 
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ranging from 0 - never to 8 - several times a week. Respondents whose parents have high levels 
of educational attainment (represented here by mother’s or father’s educational attainment, 
whichever is largest) are much more likely to finish high school and attend college themselves, 
and including parent education as an exogenous variable in the full model controls for this effect. 
 Race is represented by dummy variables for Black non-hispanic, White non-hispanic, 
other race non-hispanic, and Hispanic, with white non-hispanic as the reference group. Religious 
tradition is represented by a slightly modified version of the RELTRAD coding scheme 
(Steensland et al. 2000; Woodberry et al. 2012), with dummy variables for the following 
traditions: Conservative Protestant, Mainline Protestant, Catholic, other religion (including 
Jewish), with no affiliation as the reference category (18.57% of the sample report no affiliation). 
In part to deal with collinearity issues with the black Protestant dummy variable and the black 
race dummy variable, the black Protestant group was split and reallocated to the conservative 
and mainline Protestant groups, according to the coding used by Ellison and colleagues (Ellison, 
Musick, and Holden 2011)13. Versions of the full model were estimated with the traditional 
RELTRAD groups, with similar results. 
Measurement Model 
 This article uses the measurement model from Roos (Roos 2012), that found three 
dimensions underlying the NSF sponsored science knowledge scale found in the GSS: Physical 
sciences fact-based knowledge, Life sciences fact-based knowledge, and what Roos called 
                                                
13 Following (Ellison, Musick, and Holden 2011), the conservative Protestant group contained 
members of the following denominations: “Among the groups categorized as conservative 
Protestant were Southern Baptist, most other Baptist except for American or ‘‘Northern’’ 
Baptist, Nazarene, Church of Christ, Church of God in Christ, Christian and Missionary 
Alliance, all Pentecostal, Holiness, and Apostolic churches, Assemblies of God, Full Gospel 
Fellowship, independent Bible churches, and all other fundamentalist and evangelical groups.” 
(Ellison et al. 2011:951; Steensland et al. 2000) 
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“Young Earth Worldview”, or the belief that the Earth is less than 10,000 years old. I argue 
instead that young earth creationism is one among many ideologies that might lead to a rejection 
of scientific orthodox explanations of origins, and in these analyses I rename the dimension RSO 
to more accurately reflect the variety of beliefs that may contribute to that particular stance 
within the contested knowledge area of origins. Just as Roos argued that there were underlying 
knowledges of the physical and life sciences that lead people to respond to the NSF scale items 
in ways that mainstream science holds to be correct (or incorrect), there is an underlying identity 
that leads people to reject (or accept) mainstream science explanations for origins. Importantly, 
the human evolution and big bang theory questions reflect this underlying identity to the 
exclusion of physical or life sciences knowledge. 
 Roos found that physical sciences (PFact) and life sciences (LSFact) were positively 
correlated but distinct, and that the rejection of scientific orthodoxy with regard to origins was 
negatively associated with both, although the negative relation was strongest to physical 
sciences. In his analysis, Roos used the “bible” item from the GSS to test the religiousness of the 
dimension (Roos 2012:9) and found that not only was the bible variable a strong indicator for 
RSO, but that the relationships between RSO and other science knowledge dimensions as well as 
the R-squares for observed variables changed little with the addition. This suggests that adding 
the “bible” indicator to the model does not “pull” the RSO dimension in a direction it was not 
already oriented, and that the RSO dimension is of a religious nature. 
 The measurement model structure for the RSO dimension alongside the two science 
knowledge dimensions may be found in Figure 1 (this is similar to the figure presented in Roos 
2012; see Table 1 for specific question wordings for each variable name). In the model structure 
represented by Figure 1, likelihood to respond to the four indicators increases as RSO increases, 
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and these effect indicators are caused by the latent variable, RSO. Roos (2012) found this 
measurement structure to be a markedly better fit than either the single dimension model for 
science knowledge (Sherkat 2011) or the two dimensions model (Evans 2011). 
Figure 2: Measurement model for RSO and science knowledge 
 
For measurement analysis and a detailed explanation of the above model, see Roos (2012). 
 
Full Structural Models 
 The next step is to estimate the full structural model (see Figure 3). Like in simple 
regression, this allows multiple exogenous variables to influence outcome variables in tandem. 
However, this model additionally includes some intervening variables, or variables that are 
influenced by the exogenous variables, and that influence in turn the ultimate outcomes. This 
allows for both direct and indirect effects of exogenous variables on outcomes to be accounted 
for in the model. The next paragraphs outline how each outcome and intervening variable is 
related to the variables that help explain it. 
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Figure 3: Full model, RSO influencing science knowledge 
 
Note; paths from exogenous to endogenous variables omitted for clarity. 
†: Religious Affiliation represented by dummy variables for the following groups: Conservative Protestant, Mainline 
Protestant, Catholic, Other Religious (including Jewish), with those that reported no affiliation as the reference 
group (18.57% fell into the no affiliation category). 
††: Race represented by dummy variables for black (non-hispanic), Hispanic, other race (non-hispanic), with white 
(non-hispanic) as the reference group. 
 
 PFact and LSFact are both explained by: RSO, educational attainment, number of college 
science courses taken, parent education, religious affiliation, age, sex, race, and religious 
attendance. The effect of RSO on PFact and LSFact net of other covariates represents spillover, 
and the influence of religious affiliation (conservative Protestantism, mainline Protestant, 
Catholic, and other, compared to unaffiliated) on PFact and LSFact is both direct and allowed to 
flow indirectly through educational attainment, number of college science courses taken, and 
RSO. RSO is explained by: educational attainment, number of college science courses taken, 
parent education, religious affiliation, age, sex, race, and religious attendance. The effect of 
religious affiliation on RSO is allowed to flow directly and indirectly through both educational 
attainment and number of college science courses taken. 
 The number of college science courses taken is explained by: parent educational 
attainment, religious affiliation, age, sex, race, and religious attendance. Educational attainment 
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in years is explained by: parent educational attainment, religious affiliation, age, sex, race, and 
religious attendance. The error terms for educational attainment and number of college science 
courses taken are allowed to correlate. There is certainly some inter-correlation between 
educational attainment and number of college science courses taken, however the direction of 
influence is uncertain. 
 These relationships are represented as a path diagram in figure 3. In effect, this model 
places RSO in the position of an intervening variable rather than an ultimate outcome, which is a 
necessary analytical step to test whether or not spillover from contested knowledge areas may 
affect uncontested knowledge areas.  
 The model represented in figure 3 incorporates the relationships between variables 
described above. One of the strengths of SEMs is a variety of measures of model fit (see 
appendix for description of specific fit indices) and path specific significance tests to assess how 
well a given model fits the data. However, even a good fit is not proof of a valid model – there 
can always be other models the researcher is not aware of that fit as well (Hershberger 2006) or 
even better. It is for this reason that any causal arguments supported by SEMs must be well 
grounded in theory, just as is the case with simpler forms of linear regression. 
5 - Results 
Model Fit 
 Tables 6 and 7 present the full model. A more detailed description of goodness of fit 
statistics used may be found in the appendix, and a combination of available fit statistics were 
used to interpret fit for all models, rather than any individual statistic. This model has very good 
fit, and the explained variance of the two dimensions of uncontested science knowledge is high 
(R-squares of .612 and .571), as is the explained variance of RSO (R-square of .397). Further, 
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RSO has a strong negative effect on both physical and life sciences knowledge, net of other 
endogenous intervening variables and all exogenous controls. The only religious tradition to 
have a significant direct effect on either form of uncontested knowledge is Catholic (relative to 
non-affiliated respondents), and in both cases the Catholic effect is negative. This finding 
contrasts with Sherkat’s (Sherkat 2011) findings and is in line with analyses performed by J. H. 
Evans (Evans 2011). Conservative Protestant and Catholic also both have a negative effect on 
total number of college science courses taken (Table 7), when compared to non-affiliated 
respondents. 
Table 6: Parameter estimates from full structural model (outcome variables and RSO) 
  PFact   LSFact  RSO   
 Est Est/SE p-val Est Est/SE p-val Est Est/SE p-val 
RSO -0.220 -10.076 *** -0.092 -3.822 *** - - 
 Number of College  
Science Courses 0.054 11.339 *** 0.060 11.030 *** -0.042 -5.624 *** 
Educational  
Attainment 0.030 7.177 *** 0.060 11.532 *** -0.046 -6.489 *** 
Religious  
Attendance 0.024 5.431 *** 0.015 2.895 ** 0.104 14.649 *** 
Parent Educational  
Attainment 0.013 4.337 *** 0.018 5.072 *** -0.023 -4.577 *** 
Age -0.004 -6.226 *** -0.005 -6.484 *** 0.000 0.172 
 Female -0.316 -13.888 *** 0.188 7.944 *** 0.237 7.334 *** 
Black -0.289 -10.089 *** -0.574 -14.952 *** 0.320 6.554 *** 
Hispanic -0.209 -6.329 *** -0.360 -8.712 *** -0.087 -1.512 
 Other Race  
(Non-Hispanic) -0.296 -6.650 *** -0.463 -8.179 *** -0.076 -0.946 
 Conservative  
Protestant 0.009 0.296 
 
0.027 0.716 
 
0.495 9.348 *** 
Mainline  
Protestant -0.044 -1.492 
 
0.001 0.026 
 
-0.014 -0.272 
 Catholic -0.179 -6.183 *** -0.126 -3.557 *** -0.158 -3.196 ** 
Other Religious  
Affiliation -0.069 -1.742 + -0.074 -1.603 
 
-0.058 -0.885 
 R-Square .612 - .571 - .397 - 
N=4861, 2006-2012 waves of GSS, ***=p<.05, **=p<.01, ***=p<.001, +=p<.1 
RMSEA = .027, CFI = .952, TLI = .932, χ2 = 849.793 (df: 190; P <=.000), Schwarz-BIC = -763.12 
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 Relative to non-affiliated persons, conservative Protestant affiliation has a significant, 
negative direct effect on RSO - this effect is roughly comparable in size to 11 fewer years of 
education or 12 fewer college level science courses. Catholic has a negative effect on on RSO 
relative to non-affiliated respondents, which is in line with findings from both Sherkat (Sherkat 
2011) and Evans (Evans 2011). Religious attendance has a strong positive association with RSO 
(those that attend more frequently are more likely to reject mainstream science explanations of 
origins net of other factors), and the direct effect of religious attendance on both forms of science 
knowledge is positive but small (meaning frequent attenders know slightly more science 
knowledge than infrequent attenders, net of religious tradition and other controls). The positive 
effect of conservative Protestant affiliation on science knowledge is due to the mediating effects 
of educational attainment, college science coursework, and RSO; and this mediation is described 
in more detail below. 
 Educational attainment, parent educational attainment, and number of college science 
courses taken have positive effects on science knowledge and negative effects on RSO. Other 
exogenous control variables have strong direct effects on both science knowledge and RSO, but 
due to space concerns I will not explain their effects in great detail here. However, Females and 
non-whites had reduced physical science knowledge relative to white males, non-whites had 
reduced life sciences knowledge (Females had increased life sciences knowledge) relative to 
white males, and Females and black respondents had increased levels of RSO. Educational 
attainment, parent educational attainment, and number of college science courses taken each 
increase science knowledge and reduce RSO, net of each other. 
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Table 7: Parameter estimates from full structural model (intervening variables) 
 Educational 
Attainment 
Number of College Science 
Courses Taken 
 Est Est/SE p-val Est Est/SE p-val 
Religious  
Attendance 0.093 5.772 *** 0.084 4.912 *** 
Parent Educational  
Attainment 0.339 34.918 *** 0.200 17.326 *** 
Age 0.009 3.946 *** 0.002 0.643 
 Female 0.049 0.648 
 
-0.358 -4.532 *** 
Black -0.652 -5.582 *** -0.661 -4.805 *** 
Hispanic -1.005 -7.858 *** -0.168 -1.038 
 Other Race  
(Non-Hispanic) 0.626 3.953 *** 0.834 5.337 *** 
Conservative  
Protestant -0.700 -5.511 *** -0.632 -4.686 *** 
Mainline  
Protestant -0.097 -0.772 
 
-0.212 -1.720 + 
Catholic -0.155 -1.297 
 
-0.527 -4.114 *** 
Other Religious  
Affiliation 0.289 1.882 + 0.035 0.238 
 R-Square .253   .114  
N=4861, 2006-2012 waves of GSS, ***=p<.05, **=p<.01, ***=p<.001, +=p<.1 
RMSEA = .027, CFI = .952, TLI = .932, χ2 = 849.793 (df: 190; P <=.000), Schwarz-BIC = -763.12 
 
 Table 8 presents the direct and indirect effects of religious tradition on physical and life 
sciences knowledge from the full model. Indirect effects are the influence an exogenous variable 
has that is mediated by intervening variables; the total effect is the sum of the direct and indirect 
effects. The total effect for Conservative Protestant on physical sciences knowledge is negative (-
.168) and significant. Despite the positive and weakly significant direct effect coefficient, this 
suggests a persistent overall negative effect of affiliation with conservative Protestant 
denominations that has been mostly mediated by RSO (path specific indirect effect coefficients 
not reported here). Further, the indirect path with the largest contribution is that of conservative 
Protestant through RSO to both PFact and LSFact. In the case of indirect effects of conservative 
Protestant affiliation and PFact, the indirect path through RSO is three to four times larger in size 
than the path through either educational attainment or number of college science courses taken 
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and generates the bulk of the indirect effect (-.109 for RSO, -.021 for educational attainment, -
.034 for number of college science courses taken.) This suggest that RSO (and not educational 
attainment or college level science coursework) is the prime mediator between conservative 
Protestant affiliation and uncontested science knowledge. 
 Though not presented here, a simpler model where all intervening variables are treated as 
exogenous (and thus allowed to co-vary) yields a negative coefficient for evangelical Protestant 
affiliation on physical science knowledge of -.148, with a p-value of <.001, which are similar 
results to those seen in the full model presented here. 
Table 8: Total (direct and indirect) effects of religious tradition variables on science knowledge 
from the full model 
 Total effects Indirect Effects Direct effects 
PFact Est Est/SE p-val Est Est/SE p-val Est Est/SE p-val 
Conservative Protestant -.168 -5.497 *** -.177 -8.692 *** .009 0.296  
Mainline Protestant -.058 -1.889 + -.014 -0.883  -.044 -1.492  
Catholic -.184 -6.115 *** -.005 -0.306  -.179 -6.182 *** 
Other Religious -.042 -1.005  .027 1.302  -.069 -1.742 + 
            
LSFact Est Est/SE p-val Est Est/SE p-val Est Est/SE p-val 
Conservative Protestant -.104 -2.750 ** -.131 -6.557 *** .027 0.716  
Mainline Protestant -.017 -0.449  -.018 -1.251  .001 0.026  
Catholic -.155 -4.198 *** -.029 -1.902 + -.126 -3.557 *** 
Other Religious -.048 -0.981  .026 1.436  -.074 -1.602  
N=4861, 2006-2012 waves of GSS, ***=p<.05, **=p<.01, ***=p<.001, +=p<.1 
RMSEA = .027, CFI = .952, TLI = .932, χ2 = 849.793 (df: 190; P <=.000), Schwarz-BIC = -763.12 
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Figure 4: Indirect effect of Conservative Protestant affiliation on Physical sciences knowledge, 
through RSO 
 
Shaded line indicates indirect path with the largest effect (Conservative Protestant -> RSO -> PFact). 
 
Sensitivity Analyses 
 The 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012 waves of the GSS were pooled for these analyses for 
easy of interpretation. However, some readers may question whether or not it is appropriate to 
pool four GSS waves. Table 9 presents the results of a multiple group analysis (MGA), using 
GSS wave (2006, 2008, 2010, 2012) as the grouping variable. In the baseline model, causal paths 
between exogenous, intervening, and outcome variables are free and allowed to differ between 
waves. In the intervening fixed models, paths from all intervening variables to outcome variables 
are forced to be equal across all three waves, while paths from exogenous variables are allowed 
to vary. In the exogenous fixed models, paths from all exogenous variables and from all 
intervening variables are fixed to be equal across all waves. While the χ2 difference test p-value 
is lower than .05 for the exogenous fixed model, the BIC test suggests that the between-wave 
differences are minimal (the exogenous fixed model gains enough degrees of freedom with a low 
enough increase in the χ2 by fixing the exogenous paths to remain the same between the four 
GSS waves that the between-wave differences are minimal). An MGA is essentially an omnibus 
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test of all parameters across all groups, and based on the BIC scores in Table 9 the four waves 
may be pooled. While they are not reported here, the full model was estimated on each GSS 
wave separately, with similar results to the pooled model.  
Table 9: Multiple Group Analysis (MGA) results for full model, groups are GSS waves 2006, 
2008, 2010, and 2012 
 Model Fit MGA χ2 difference test 
Model RMSEA CFI TLI χ2 DF  p-val BIC χ2 df p-val 
Baseline .025 .955 .938 1378.332 784 .000 -5277.04 - - - 
Intervening Fixed .025 .955 .940 1402.670 811 .000 -5481.91 33.459 27 .1823 
Exogenous Fixed .022 .956 .951 1561.390 977 .000 -6732.36 226.459 166 .0013 
Pooled .027 .952 .932 849.793 290 .000 -763.12 - - - 
N=4861 
 
 An attempt was made to break those with Catholic affiliation into conservative and non-
conservative groups, following the method used by Evans (Evans 2011) using the “popespks” 
variable from the GSS, an item asking: “Under certain conditions, the pope is infallible when he 
speaks on matters of faith and morals.” (Smith et al. 2010), with responses “certainly false”, 
“probably false”, “I am uncertain whether this is false or true”, “probably true”, and “certainly 
true”. Neither group behaved differently than the combined group of Catholic affiliation in the 
full model, so the category was left combined. 
 Versions of the full model with added exogenous variables to control for how rural the 
respondent’s location may be, measured by population density, and having remained in the US 
South since age 16, measured by the region and region16 variables. As the south is at once very 
rural and has a high concentration of evangelical and black Protestants, this was to rule out a 
Southern region effect. Results in these models were similar to those reported here. 
 An alternate version of the full model with conservative Protestants (rather than 
unaffiliated persons) was the reference group. In this alternate model, all religious affiliation 
categories (Mainline Protestant, Catholic, Other Religious, and Unaffiliated) had significant and 
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large negative coefficients for RSO, meaning that all groups tends to reject scientific orthodoxy 
less than conservative Protestants. Also, in this model, the total effects for Catholic on physical 
and life sciences knowledge were insignificant, while other traditions (Mainline Protestant, Other 
Religions, Unaffiliated) had significant positive total effects on both physical and life sciences 
knowledge. 
 An additional alternative model was estimated using information from the religious 
tradition at age 16 variables. RELTRAD groupings at age 16 were created, and religious tradition 
was coded as always conservative Protestant, always mainline and black Protestant, always 
Catholic, and always Other, for those respondents that were in the same category at both age 16 
and the time of interview. Others were were only in the category of religious affiliation at the 
time of interview (that is, were in a different category at 16) were placed in separate groups. The 
recently converted and lifelong adherents had nearly identical results in the full model. 
 Some readers may question the specification of directional paths between RSO and 
science knowledge dimensions. A final alternative model was estimated where RSO was 
specified as the ultimate outcome with PFact and LSFact as intermediate outcomes, effectively 
reversing the direction of the paths between RSO and both forms of science knowledge. As these 
models make use of the same observed variables and sample, their BIC scores may be compared 
for model arbitration. The model presented here was the preferred model, meaning that 
directional paths from RSO to LSFact and PFact is closer to the true model than paths flowing 
the opposite way. 
6 - Discussion 
 Drawing from the total and indirect effects shown in Table 8, I find evidence for the 
claim that conservative forms of Protestantism may lead to reduced science knowledge. 
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Conservative Protestants tend to have lower levels of both physical and life sciences knowledge, 
an effect that is mediated by educational attainment, number of college science courses taken, 
and RSO. Part of this indirect effect flows through educational variables. It is difficult to parse 
this mediation effect in cross-sectional data, and two mechanisms may be at work: first, where 
conservative protestants are less likely to reach greater levels of educational attainment, although 
this mechanism is at odds with the findings of Beyerlein (2004); the second potential mechanism 
is where greater levels of educational attainment and college science coursework effectively 
“secularize” the contested knowledge area for those respondents. Following Chaves’ definition 
of secularization as declining religious authority (Chaves 1994), a mechanism that results in 
individuals accepting the rules for assessing legitimate knowledge from the scientific rather than 
religious sphere is therefore a secularizing effect. For both physical and life sciences knowledge, 
the indirect path through RSO is larger than either that through educational attainment or through 
college science coursework. This suggests that while education is important, religious identity 
(specifically, the identity of RSO) has a much stronger influence on uncontested science 
knowledge.  
 RSO has a direct negative effect on both forms of uncontested science knowledge, net of 
relevant controls. This negative effect represents spillover, or a rejection of the rules for 
assessing legitimate knowledge from an opposed sphere outside a contested knowledge area as 
well as inside it. If claims science makes on legitimacy in the area of origins are invalid, then 
what science claims in other areas (gravity, radiation, thermodynamics, medicine) may be just as 
invalid. 
 In addressing the second research question, whether conservative Protestantism has an 
impact on RSO, the results shown in Table 6 demonstrate evidence for a strong effect, even 
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allowing for the mediating effects of educational attainment and college science coursework. 
Conservative Protestants are far more likely to reject orthodox scientific explanations for origins 
than non religiously-affiliated persons, and while Catholics tend to have reduced uncontested 
science knowledge relative to unaffiliated persons, they also are less likely to reject orthodox 
scientific explanations for origins than unaffiliated persons. 
 The results above demonstrate clear evidence in support of the claim that rejecting 
scientific orthodoxy in the area of origins influences uncontested science knowledge. The 
indirect influence of conservative Protestant affiliation on uncontested science knowledge 
through the rejection of mainstream scientific understandings of origins is a critical finding of 
this article. However, the direct negative influence from RSO to both physical and life sciences 
knowledge points to an understudied relationship between controversial, contested knowledge 
areas and uncontested knowledge. 
Conclusions 
 This article introduces the concepts of contested knowledge and spillover in part to 
address the incongruences in the sociology of religion literature surrounding the relation between 
conservative religious traditions and science knowledge. Contested knowledge, or areas of 
knowledge where there are multiple, competing truth claims - each with separate means for 
assessing legitimate knowledge - shape the nature of the intersection between two spheres. 
Additionally, in some cases threats to the legitimacy of knowledge within a contested area can 
spill over to uncontested knowledge. In this article, I demonstrate that to disregard a contested 
knowledge area when attempting to explain the intersection of two spheres of authority runs the 
risk of sidestepping a core defining issue of the intersection in question. In the particular case 
used in this article, failure to focus on the contested knowledge area of origins could lead to 
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spurious results at worst and conflicting results at best (Evans 2011; Sherkat 2011) when 
examining the relation between religious tradition and uncontested science knowledge. 
 Further work on the intersection between science and religion would benefit from an 
approach that accounts for contested knowledge areas as pivotal points of contention between the 
two spheres. Additional work on the ways that rejection of mainstream, orthodox scientific 
understandings of origins could lead to a reduction in other science knowledge is needed, as is a 
better understanding of the extent to which these rejections are entirely or partially motivated by 
attitudes and beliefs from within the religious sphere. Going forward, other controversial issues 
in the public’s understanding of science could benefit from a similar analysis. Even if the 
opposed sphere of influence that overlaps with that of science and creates the relevant contested 
knowledge area is other than the sphere of religion, the processes are likely the same, and stem 
from the same causes: incommensurable sets of meanings and legitimate knowledge. More 
broadly, the concept of contested knowledge may aid in understanding other areas of epistemic 
conflict than those discussed here. Any topic or issue where there are multiple legitimate claims 
to truth may function similarly to the case of origins described here. 
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CHAPTER IV: THE REJECTION OF SCIENTIFIC ORTHODOXY: A PANEL STUDY 
OF THE DURABILITY OF A CONTESTED KNOWLEDGE AREA FROM 2006-2010 
 
1 - Introduction 
 First published in 1859, Darwin’s On the Origin of Species is widely regarded as the 
foundational work in evolutionary biology. Though many evolutionary ideas existed prior to its 
publication and the mechanics of evolution have undergone quasi-paradigmatic shifts since14, 
Darwin’s name remains the lightning rod for critiques of evolutionary theory. And, while the 
fundamental tenets of evolution are accepted as orthodoxy in evolutionary biology and related 
sciences, controversy over the legitimacy of evolution rages on in the public discourse of the 
United States. Indeed, this has become one of the main areas of public debate at the intersection 
of science and religion in the US.  
 This is hardly a new debate, as those familiar with the Scopes “Monkey” Trial (Gieryn, 
Bevins, and Zehr 1985) will certainly be aware. Some scholars argue that there is no inherent 
epistemological conflict between religion and science (Ecklund 2010; Evans and Evans 2008; 
Longest and Smith 2011), however most scholars who work in the area of science and religion 
admit that for many individuals, there is a conflict between religious and scientific explanations 
for the sources of the complexity of life and the origins of the universe (origins henceforth). 
Contested areas of knowledge such as these are critically important to study because of the way 
                                                
14 Notable new schools of thought in evolutionary biology since Darwin’s time include: Huxley’s 
Modern Synthesis (Huxley 1942), Gould’s Punctuated Equilibrium (Eldredge and Gould 1972; 
Gould and Eldredge 1977), and E.O. Wilson’s Sociobiology (Wilson 2000). 
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that positions within them can influence attitudes about related areas of knowledge that are not in 
conflict (Roos 2013). 
 The ongoing debate over evolution is also not a debate driven by the dissent of only a 
small minority, as Gallup polling data has found only a quarter of US Citizens believe in 
evolution generally (Newport 2009) and as many as 46% reject human evolution, specifically 
(Newport 2012; Plutzer and Berkman 2008). These figures have been roughly stable since 
Gallup began asking these questions in 1982. In measures of scientific literacy, Roos (Roos 
2012) has demonstrated that survey items tapping these attitudes are poor measures of 
uncontested forms of basic science knowledge, and that this distinction in the United States dates 
as far back as 1995 (as far back as data are available). 
 The rejection of evolution and associated concepts (an old universe, an old earth) in the 
general public has serious implications for the nation. The first, and likely most visible, is 
massive local support across the country for campaigns to introduce creationism and/or 
intelligent design into primary and secondary school science curricula. If the rejection of 
evolution stands at a relatively stable 30-40% in the United States where much of the 
information about and legitimacy of evolution as an explanation for the complexity of life flows 
through educational institutions, it is uncertain how rates of rejection may change if alternatives 
that cast that legitimacy into doubt become commonplace additions to school science curricula. 
As of 2006, the United States ranked next-to-last in a ranking of 34 countries on rates of 
acceptance of evolution (Miller et al. 2006), and those same scholars draw links between 
acceptance of evolution and knowledge of genetics - a key area of innovation in medical 
technology during the years since and likely for the very near future. Moreover, to the extent that 
the rejection of evolution reflects a specific religious identity (Roos 2013), it may also serve as a 
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“shared status or relation” or collective identity (Polletta and Jasper 2001:285), and as a 
collective identity may serve to help mobilize actors in support of bringing creationism or 
intelligent design into school curricula. Further, rejection of evolution may be a component of a 
broader, religious conservative collective identity that may be mobilized towards other ends 
related to education, such as sex education and in-school prayer.  
 Another serious implication of these stable rates of rejection is public support for science 
funding. Evolutionary biology, human and physical anthropology, paleontology, and genetics are 
just a handful of fields that rely (at least in part) on public funding for basic research. As the 
recent US Senate debacle over Political Science NSF funding demonstrates, public science funds 
are vulnerable to political attack, and a reduction in rates of acceptance of evolution and related 
ideas may erode support for such research funding. Additionally, as a discussion continues over 
the coming crisis in potential shortages of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics 
(STEM) workers, high rates of rejection of evolution likely play a part in steering some sectors 
of the population away from STEM majors and STEM careers. 
 These implications raise key questions about the rejection of evolution and related ideas. 
What is the life course of the rejection of evolution and related ideas? It is important to plot 
trajectories of change in RSO over time to better understand how rates of rejection may change 
in the future. Is there an overall trend in the US population of increase or decrease? That is, is it 
natural for individuals to grow in their rejection of evolution over time; or does rejection decline 
as a person ages and has more life experiences? Do any particular groups within the United 
States have unique trajectories different from that of the general public? Alternatively, are there 
stable individual differences in their degrees of rejection that are set before adulthood and are 
resistant to change? 
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 Gallup data shows higher rates of rejection (or, lower rates of acceptance) among 
frequent attenders of religious services. Elsewhere, Roos (Roos 2013) identified an association 
between religious service attendance and the rejection of evolution, but this association remains 
poorly understood. Does religious service attendance influence the rejection of evolution, or does 
the influence flow in the opposite direction? A third possibility is that both rejection of evolution 
and associated ideas on the one hand and religious service attendance on the other each have a 
unique trajectory of change over time in the United States population, and any interrelation 
between these constructs is in initial levels or rates of change over time in individuals or groups.  
 This article tests three latent curve models to investigate the nature of the link between 
religious attendance measures and the rejection of mainstream, orthodox scientific explanations 
for origins (evolution and related ideas) using the General Social Survey (GSS) panel data set for 
2006: (a) religious attendance as a covariate that influences the rejection of evolution and related 
ideas for each wave of the data; (b) the reverse relationship - religious attendance as a covariate 
that is influenced by the rejection of evolution for each wave of the data; and (c) the over time 
trajectories and initial values of rejection of evolution and religious attendance are correlated but 
distinct variables. This data is ideal for these analyses because of both the presence of items that 
measure the rejection of evolution and related ideas as well as religious attendance, and the fact 
that the panel data spans a presidential election year (2008) where science was part of the public 
debate. In the following sections, I will further explain the rejection of mainstream science 
explanations for origins, describe the data and models estimated in detail, and follow with a 
discussion of results and conclusions. 
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2 - Background 
Science, Religion, and Origins 
 Resistance to evolution and related ideas from the religious sphere has existed since the 
time of Darwin, although not often as a unified set of alternative ideas (Numbers 2006). Public 
opinion trend data indicates that a sizeable minority of the American public rejects human 
evolution (Newport 2012; Plutzer and Berkman 2008), and that proportion of this minority is 
relatively stable over time; ranging from 40-45% since the early 80’s. In part as a response to the 
tensions between the scientific and religious spheres, many scholars have searched for key points 
of conflict between science and religion in the area of origins, looking to social movement 
attempts to introduce creationism into public school curricula (Baker 2013; Binder 2004, 2007), 
the lesson plans and hours spent on teaching evolution by high school biology teachers 
(Berkman, Pacheco, and Plutzer 2008), and attitudes of research scientists (Ecklund and Scheitle 
2007; Ecklund 2010).  
 Some sociologists have examined the relationship between religious affiliation and other 
measures of religiosity and science knowledge or literacy, though the tendency is to either lump 
items about human evolution along with other less-contested measures of science knowledge 
(Gauchat 2010; Sherkat 2011) or to separate out “conflict” issues into a separate scale while 
focusing the bulk of analysis on uncontested knowledge (Evans 2011). Roos (Roos 2013) argues 
that positions on origins (specifically, the acceptance or rejection of mainstream, scientific 
explanations) have influence on uncontested knowledge net of other factors. Roos identified a 
strong association between religious attendance and RSO, net of religious affiliation, educational 
attainment, or other demographic controls. The next section will discuss the rejection of 
scientific orthodoxy in greater detail. 
	   
	  
73 
Rejection of Scientific Orthodoxy (RSO) 
Rejection of scientific orthodoxy (RSO) is a specific orientation within the contested knowledge 
area of origins (Roos 2012). It entails the rejection (generally for religious reasons) of 
mainstream, orthodox scientific explanations of the beginnings of the universe, the first spark of 
life, and the complexity and variation of life over the millennia since. For those that reject 
scientific orthodox explanations for origins, the concept of humans evolving from earlier life 
forms is false despite the average holder of RSO being aware of the concept and further likely 
being aware that most scientists hold evolution in high regard. By association, other ideas related 
to uniformitarianism15 or geological gradualism, such as continental drift or even the big bang 
(the former points to an ancient Earth, the latter to an even more ancient universe) are also 
considered false. As an ideology, RSO aligns with the goals of those working to bring Intelligent 
Design (ID) into school curricula, and with young and old earth creationists (Degler 1992; 
Forrest and Gross 2004; Numbers 1982, 2006; Pennock 2003, 2010; Sober 2007). Defined as a 
rejection of orthodox science explanations, it is not a single worldview. However, aligned within 
RSO are several worldviews that reject mainstream science on origins, reflecting the variety of 
conflicting alternate explanations for origins that exist (Numbers 2006). 
 The RSO perspective is not simply a feature of conservative Protestantism. While there is 
some degree of overlap, both in ideologies and in persons that hold RSO strongly while also 
being conservative Protestants, individuals who would not be typically placed in the conservative 
Protestant category may also hold RSO strongly - in the 2006-2010 waves of the GSS this 
                                                
15 The position that the physical processes we see at work today have likely been in place for 
millions or billions of years, thus phenomena like the Grand Canyon, beaches, fjords, and glacial 
lakes (as well as measurable radioactive decay) all suggest we live on a very old planet (Lyell 
2011) , and is clarified by S. J. Gould as “…a procedural principle asserting spatial and temporal 
invariance of natural laws…” (Gould 1965:223). 
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includes some Catholics, members of other Protestant traditions, and others. RSO is a construct 
representing rejection of specific truth claims about the world, and it should come as no surprise 
that such a dimension does not map perfectly onto categories like religious denomination. 
 A recent Gallup poll found that nearly half of US citizens reject mainstream science 
accounts of human origins (Newport 2012), responding that they believe that humans were 
created in their current form within the last 10,000 years16. This proportion has been stable since 
Gallup first started asking the question in 1982. Gallup further disaggregates those that hold 
evolutionist views into theistic evolutionists (or those that hold that humans evolved from earlier 
forms with God’s help) and secular evolutionists. While the proportion of those that hold a 
secular evolutionist view has increased slightly in the most recent samples, this increase is from a 
reduction in the proportion of those that hold theistic evolution, not from those that hold a 
creationist account. Gallup finds that more religious people tend to hold creationist accounts, 
though the report only looked at religious attendance as a measure for religiosity. A question 
about human evolution similar to that asked by Gallup can be found in the Survey of Public 
Attitudes and Understanding of Science and Technology (National Science Board 2012) included 
since 2006 in the GSS, and is used here as one of the indicators of RSO (Roos 2012). These 
numbers suggest that the proportion of US adults that hold RSO strongly may be large. 
 Some scholars have used the NSF scale (and a similar scale that is only present in the 
2008 GSS) to delineate the conflict, if any, between religion and science in the minds and hearts 
                                                
16 Question wording and response categories (Newport 2012): “Which of the following 
statements comes closest to your views on the origin and development of human beings? 
(1) Human beings have developed over millions of years from less advanced forms of 
life, but God has guided this progress,  
(2) Human beings have developed over millions of years from less advanced forms of 
life, but God had no part in this process,  
(3) God created human beings pretty much in their present form at one time within the 
last 10,000 years or so.” 
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of US citizens (Evans 2011; Sherkat 2011). There has been some disagreement about how best to 
deal with the evolution survey item (Rughiniş 2011) as well as another item about the big bang, 
as these items may tap religious beliefs in addition to science knowledge. Roos (Roos 2012) 
argues that these survey items not only measure specific, conservative religious beliefs, but that 
they may not measure particular science knowledge in any meaningful way. Rather, they are 
indicators for a specific, religiously-motivated perspective: RSO (Roos 2013). Holders of RSO 
may be young earth creationists (Numbers 2006), old earth creationists, or they may reject 
mainstream science explanations for the origins and variation of life and the origin of the 
universe for other reasons.  
 In this article, RSO is conceptualized as a religious identity based position on the veracity 
(or lack thereof) of mainstream scientific explanations for origins. With this formulation, a set of 
specific questions about the stability of that position and its relation to religious attendance 
become important. These questions are outlined in the next section. 
Religious Attendance 
 Survey measures of religious attendance similar to that in the GSS receive a great deal of 
scrutiny. Such items are frequently treated as measures of behavior (that is, as more or less valid 
measures of religious attendance), as indicators of network embeddedness, as measures of 
religiosity more generally, and as identity. A host of studies in the throughout the 1980’s, 1990’s 
and 2000’s found evidence for links between religious attendance and psychological well-being 
(Barkan and Greenwood 2003; Williams et al. 1991), Mortality (Hummer et al. 1999) , and 
political and egalitarian attitudes (Finlay and Walther 2003; Olson, Cadge, and Harrison 2006). 
Though, during this same period there was also growing recognition that the mechanisms linking 
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religious attendance and health outcomes was unclear (Ellison and Levin 1998; Idler et al. 2003; 
Levin and Vanderpool 1987). 
 In recent evidence on the trajectories of religious attendance over the life course, a more 
or less consensus story is emerging: a decline in early adulthood, stability in midlife, and an 
increase in the later stages of the life course. (Uecker et al. 2007) find that those who do not 
attend college tend to experience a sharper decline in religious attendance than others. They use 
as their outcome variable difference between measures of service attendance at different waves 
of the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health, and in dichotomizing the declines, they 
code increases and stability in rates of attendance both as zero (Uecker et al. 2007:1673). Other 
recent studies have found similar evidence for a decline in attendance at this stage of the life 
course (Hayward and Krause 2013; Petts 2009). In age, period, and cohort model analyses, 
(Schwadel 2011) found a general positive effect for age on religious attendance, although 
Schwadel dichotomized the measure, with those that reported attending 2-3 times per month or 
more as 1 and once per month or fewer as zero. 
 In an innovative article, Philip Brenner (Brenner 2011) used multiple imputation for 
multiple studies (MIMS) (Gelman, King, and Liu 1998) to tie respondents in the GSS with those 
in the American Time Use Study (ATUS), and then compared responses to the GSS religious 
attendance measure to the time diary reports of service attendance in the ATUS. When using 
MIMS, variables from data set 1 not present in data set 2 are treated as missing completely at 
random (MCAR). In the MIMS procedure Brenner utilized, information from variables present 
in both data sets was used to impute values for variables not present (i.e. time-use diary 
information) in the GSS. While this method is unable to account for differences in sampling or 
data collection procedures between the surveys (Gelman et al. 1998), in cases where both data 
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sets are representative it allows analyses “otherwise not possible” (Brenner 2011:106). Brenner 
also dichotomized religious attendance from the GSS, with those that report attendance 2-3 times 
per month or more as “regular and frequent” attenders (Brenner 2011:107) coded as 1, and those 
reporting less frequent attendance coded as zero. Brenner argues that overreporting of religious 
attendance is more than just a measurement artifact, but data in its own right (Brenner 2011:104). 
Brenner finds some evidence that religious salience (Stryker 1980) or importance of religious 
identity can help disaggregate overreporters from non-attenders, but fails to disaggregate 
overreporters from “honest” attenders. This may be due to the cut point chosen for the 
dichotomization of the GSS attendance measure (Brenner chose a cut point that mirrored the 
categories in ATUS) or because attendance is a poor indicator of identity. This second 
explanation contrasts with claims made by (Hadaway et al. 1993; Hadaway, Marler, and Chaves 
1998), who argued that overreporting religious service attendance is a “truthful” report of the 
respondent’s religious identity rather than “about actual attendance” (emphasis original; 
Hadaway et al. 1998:127) 
 This dissensus in how best to code survey measures of religious attendance such as those 
included in the GSS is one part of the measurement puzzle; the other is what such survey items 
are actually measuring: religiosity, identity, or behavior. This second portion of the measurement 
puzzle is a chief motivator for the analyses that follow. 
Religious Identity and Cultural Dispositions 
 According to work by Sheldon Stryker (Owens, Robinson, and Smith-Lovin 2010; 
Stryker and Burke 2000; Stryker 2008), identities are linked to positions in social structure. Of 
the many roles individuals play in modern societies, the role of the devout is a highly salient one 
for many, while the role of the scientific empiricist is likely less common. In the work of (Tajfel 
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and Turner 1979) and (Tajfel 1982), identities arise from perceived membership in a social 
group. Religious congregations (and the larger denominations of which they are a part) are a 
natural example of this sort of social group. Individuals negotiate and announce these identities 
in part by what (Snow and Anderson 1987) call “identity work”. Particularly when interacting 
with persons outside their social groupings, individuals engage in conversational behaviors, and 
“embracement” (Snow and Anderson 1987:1354) is behavior where the speech actor accepts and 
attaches themselves to a particular identity. 
 In this article, the RSO dimension is treated as both a signifier of a specific identity as 
well as a dimension signifying the possession of a specific knowledge. The purpose of this 
distinction is that there are likely many who know what most mainstream scientists would hold 
to be the “correct” answers to some of the RSO indicators, but they chose alternate responses to 
signify their lack of faith in the legitimacy of those particular knowledge authorities. That is: 
scoring highly on the RSO dimension likely signifies identity more than knowledge17.  
 This review points to some specific unaddressed issues: how do religious attendance 
measures relate to RSO? Do survey measures of religious attendance capture participatory 
behaviors that influence acceptance or rejection of evolution and related ideas, or does the 
identity reflected by the acceptance or rejection of evolution also influence response to the 
religious attendance measure? Additionally, does RSO change over time within individuals, and 
if so what is the trajectory of that change? These questions will be addressed in the subsequent 
sections. 
                                                
17 Teasing apart these two concepts require experimental data; alternate wording of the RSO 
survey items. Such alternate wordings are present in the 2012 GSS, but an analysis of the 
alternate wordings is beyond the scope of this article. 
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3 - Data, Methods, and Measures 
 This paper uses panel data from the 2006-2010 waves of the GSS, a nationally 
representative sample of United States adults, and as such can be used to make inferences about 
the US adult population at large (Davis et al. 2009; Smith et al. 2010). The 2006 GSS panel data 
set has two follow up waves of data collection, in 2008 and 2010, and the indicators for RSO are 
present in all three waves, making the 2006 GSS panel data ideal for these analyses. 
 The GSS began in 1972 with representative samples of the United States yearly or bi-
yearly since. The GSS consists of a core of demographic and social variables with various topical 
modules added (Davis et al. 2009; Smith et al. 2010). The GSS panel is an ideal source of data 
for this project because of the inclusion of the indicators for RSO and the panel design. The GSS 
2006-2010 panel data consists of 1968 individuals sampled in 2006, 1512 of which were 
resampled in 2008, and 1257 of those resampled were again resampled in 2010.  
 The models discussed below were estimated in Mplus 7 (Muthén and Muthén 2011), and 
indicators were treated as categorical dependent variables, using weighted least squares mean 
and variance adjusted estimation (WLSMV), with the default probit link type which allows for 
correlated error terms between indicators. A variety of fit indices were used to assess model fit 
(for details see Appendix), and a combination of available fit statistics was used to interpret 
model fit, rather than any individual statistic. 
Latent Curve Models 
 One advantage of panel data is the ability to track changes over time. Using latent curve 
models, researchers can test whether or not change is occurring, as well as detect the direction of 
that change. Another advantage of this family of models is the resolution to disaggregate 
individual from contextual effects, and allows for the examination of change over time within 
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individuals (Bollen and Curran 2005; Duncan and Duncan 2009:979). Given a mean rate of 
change over time, greater variance around that mean indicates individual deviations from the 
group trajectory in the outcome. 
 The latent curve models (LCM) specified here in the models to be described below 
conform to the basic two-factor model structure for a LCM with three time points (Duncan, 
Duncan, and Strycker 2006; Kline 2011), although with multiple categorical indicators. One of 
these models is what is called a bivariate LCM, or a model where two latent curves are specified 
(Bollen and Curran 2005). All three of the models described below are a variant of a general 
structural equation model (SEM) (Bollen and Curran 2005; Bollen 1989; Kline 2011) where 
rather than estimating the direct effect of covariates on outcomes of interest (in this case, RSO or 
religious attendance in years 2006, 2008, and 2010 using the GSS 2006 panel data), a latent 
slope and intercept term representing the start point and change (over time) in the outcome 
variables is inserted into the model, and any covariates are allowed to influence these. 
 In the basic two-factor LCM, an outcome is measured at three time points. Two latent 
variables are specified as influencing these three outcome measures; a latent intercept variable or 
initial level for the outcome and a latent slope variable or rate of change over time. The latent 
intercept may be considered the start point for the outcome, and in the SEM approach influences 
each repeated measure of the outcome equally (typically, factor loadings are constrained to 1). 
The latent slope variable may be considered the mean change over time across all time points 
and for the entire group. Typically the first time point outcome measure loads on the slope at 
zero, and subsequent time points at factor loadings corresponding to the elapsed time between 
measures - in the case of the GSS, these loadings might be 0, 2, and 4. The three models to be 
evaluated here will be described in greater detail in the next section. 
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4 - Models 
Basic RSO Measurement Model 
 In these analyses, RSO is defined above as: the rejection (generally for religious reasons) 
of mainstream, orthodox scientific explanations of the beginnings of the universe, the first spark 
of life, and the variation of life over the millennia since. RSO is an abstract variable that we can 
only measure indirectly.  In this sense, there are no perfect measures of it, though we can find 
indicators that measure it with error. For concepts such as this, summed scales or single 
indicators do not control for the inevitable measurement error in such indicator items. Further, 
this measurement error can bias results in unpredictable ways. To deal with this problem, RSO is 
treated as a latent variable in these analyses. There has been little prior work on the measurement 
model suggested here, and in this case fitting a measurement model before the full model allows 
the researcher to see how it performs - a poorly fitting measurement model is unlikely to perform 
well in a full structural model.  
 Following the measurement analysis in Roos (Roos 2012), RSO is measured by the 
responses to the following questions: “Human beings, as we know them today, developed from 
earlier species of animals. (Is that true or false?)”; “The universe began with a huge explosion. 
(Is that true or false?)”; and “The continents on which we live have been moving their locations 
for millions of years and will continue to move in the future. (Is that true or false?)”; and “Which 
of these statements comes closest to describing your feelings about the Bible?” with responses 
“The Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally, word for word.”, “The Bible is 
the inspired word of God but not everything in it should be taken literally, word for word”, and 
“The Bible is an ancient book of fables, legends, history, and moral precepts recorded by men.”  
These represent responses to questions about human evolution, whether or not the universe 
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began with an explosion, whether or not the continents move, and whether or not the Bible is the 
literal word of God, respectively. See Table 1 for more information about these survey items. 
Figures 5 and 6 represent the measurement model described above; Figure 5 is with a single 
latent variable for RSO and four indicator variables, using data from the 2006 wave of the GSS. 
Figure 6 represents a measurement model using all three waves of the 2006 GSS panel data. 
Figure 5: Measurement model for RSO, using only the GSS 2006 time point 
 
N=1968, chi-square: 5.140, DF: 2; RMSEA: .028; CFI: .997; TLI: .991; BIC: -10.03 
Chi-square p-value: .0765 
 
Figure 6: Measurement model structure for RSO across three time points (2006, 2008, 2010). 
 
Curved arrows above represent correlated errors between items with identical wording, curved arrows below 
represent correlations between RSO latent variables between time points. 
N=1988, chi-square: 97.206, DF: 47; RMSEA: .023; CFI: .996; TLI: .994; BIC: -259.754 
 
 When RSO is considered as a form of identity, certain responses to the items that make 
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salient. For those that reject mainstream scientific explanations for origins, the answers to the 
evolution, big bang, and continental drift questions are false (rather than true), and as this is a 
mostly religious orientation (Roos 2012), rejecters will tend to select more literalist responses to 
the Bible question (as this represents a common alternative set of truth claims about the origins 
area). Unlike the bible item, the former three represent pieces of information related to the set of 
truth claims from the scientific sphere, and their falseness is packaged into the ongoing rhetoric 
about the universe that rejecters of scientific orthodoxy read, hear, and create.  
Table 10: RSO indicators 
Now, I would like to ask you a few short questions like those you might see on a television game show. 
For each statement that I read, please tell me if it is true or false. If you don’t know or aren’t sure, just tell 
me so, and we will skip to the next question. Remember true, false, or don’t know. 
 
BIGBANG1, 2: The universe began with a huge explosion. (Is that true or false?) 
CONDRIFT1, 2: The continents on which we live have been moving their locations for millions of 
years and will continue to move in the future. (Is that true or false?) 
EVOLVED1, 2: Human beings, as we know them today, developed from earlier species of animals. (Is 
that true or false?) 
BIBLE2: Which of these statements comes closest to describing your feelings about the Bible? 
 1 = The Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally, word for word. 
2 = The Bible is the inspired word of God but not everything in it should be taken 
literally, word for word. 
3 = The Bible is an ancient book of fables, legends, history, and moral precepts 
recorded by men. 
1: All items had a “don’t know” response option, and these were coded as incorrect answers in each case, as done by 
Evans (2011) , (Gauchat 2010), and (Roos 2012), with the reasoning that for an item assessing factual knowledge, a 
“don’t know” response is incorrect. Responses were recoded as 0=incorrect and 1=correct 
2: All observed indicators are reverse coded in these analyses. 
 
 In preparation for fitting latent curve models, the confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) 
represented in Figure 7 has additional constraints. Latent growth curve models with multiple 
categorical indicators require measurement invariance of the latent factors across all time points 
(Muthén and Muthén 2011:123). To specify measurement invariance of RSO over time, the 
thresholds and factor loadings of RSO indicators are set to be equal across all time points (the 
bible indicator has three categories and thus two thresholds; each of these two thresholds are 
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constrained to be equal across all time points separately). Additionally, scale factors for RSO 
indicators at time point 2006 are set to one, and at other time points estimated freely. 
Religious Attendance 
 The religious attendance item in the GSS is generated by asking the respondent the 
following question: “How often do you attend religious services?” Response categories range 
from “Never” to “About once a month” to “Several times a week”. Frequencies of responses to 
the religious attendance item at the 2006 time point are in Table 11. 
 In part to address potential measurement concerns, versions of the three models to 
arbitrate in the following section were estimated with attendance treated as a continuous variable 
as well as an ordered categorical variable, with similar results. Other coding schemes are detailed 
in the sensitivity analysis section below. 
Table 11: Religious Attendance frequencies, from 2006 time point of 2006-2010 GSS panel 
Response Category Freq. Percent 
Never  467 23.44 
Less than once a year  120 6.02 
About once or twice a year  257 12.90 
Several times a year  212 10.64 
About once a month  125 6.28 
2-3 times a month  170 8.53 
Nearly every week  111 5.57 
Every week  376 18.88 
Several times a week  154 7.73 
Total 1,992 100 
 
Latent Curve Models (LCM) A, B and C 
 RSO, whether considered a marker of identity or more simply as a signifier of the 
dominance of the religious or scientific spheres over a contested area of knowledge (Roos 2013), 
has an uncertain stability. While RSO has been linked to educational attainment, religious 
attendance, and conservative Protestant affiliation (Roos 2013), it remains unclear whether and 
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how RSO may fluctuate over time, especially when covariates are also allowed fluctuate 
(specifically religious attendance). 
 On the one hand, US American adults change religious affiliation infrequently - though 
roughly half of US Americans do change at least once at some point in the life course (The Pew 
Forum on Religion and Public Life Project 2009). However, changes in religious attendance are 
more frequent (Hayward and Krause 2013). These shifts in commitment to the religious sphere 
may result in fluctuations of that sphere’s influence over contested knowledge over the life 
course, for reasons other than epistemic conflict (Evans 2011, 2013). On the other hand, the 
greatest secularizing influence on the contested knowledge area of origins is most likely 
education (Roos 2013). Most adults have completed their educational attainment by age 25, and 
the effects of educational attainment on knowledge and attitudes at later points in the life course 
may be static.  
 As briefly described above, this article will evaluate three models representing the 
relationship between RSO and religious attendance over time. The first of these, Model A, 
represents the case where religious attendance influences RSO. In this case, the behavior and 
practice of religious service attendance may serve to weaken or reinforce the salience of the RSO 
identity. Thus, frequent attendance might increase RSO, while infrequent attendance might 
decrease it. In Model B, reports of religious attendance may be another indicator of the RSO 
identity. Survey reports of religious attendance are known to capture identity at least in part 
(Brenner 2011; Hadaway et al. 1993), and in this case that identity presentation is intimately tied 
with that of the rejection of evolution identity. Lastly, Model C represents the case where RSO 
and religious service attendance have separate trajectories. In this case, while initial levels and 
rates of change of both RSO and religious attendance may be correlated, they are measuring 
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different constructs and thus have independent trajectories of change. Further, their initial levels 
and rates of change may be influenced by socio-demographic and religious affiliation 
background characteristics differently. These three curve models are represented in Figure 3. 
Figure 7: Time varying covariate, unconditional, and paired curve models. 
 
 
 The inclusion of both slope and intercept terms (and paths from covariates to each) allow 
the model to capture the effect covariates have on the start point for the outcomes in question 
(RSO), as well as any influence the covariates may have on how the outcomes change over time. 
For model identification purposes, the loadings of the outcomes on the slope and intercept are 
fixed; loadings on the intercept are fixed at 1 and loadings on the slope are fixed at zero for time 
point 1 (path not represented in Figure), and typically fixed at values corresponding to the time 
scale of the panel data - in this case 2 and 4 for the second and third time points, corresponding 
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to the two years of elapsed time between waves. These models are estimated and result detailed 
in the following section. 
Model Arbitration 
 A simple (or unconstrained) growth curve model for RSO with no covariates has 
excellent model fit (see Table 12). While the slope latent variable had a small negative mean 
(meaning RSO declines slightly over time), it had a variance indistinguishable from zero. This 
suggests there are few if any individual difference in the rate of change in RSO over time. 
Variance for the RSO slope term (Sr) was constrained to zero in each of the three models to be 
arbitrated. 
 Next, the three models shown in Figure 7 were estimated. As each of these models made 
use of the same observed variables and same sample, the BIC scores may be used to arbitrate 
between them. Model A, which includes religious attendance as a time-varying covariate that 
influences RSO, has good overall fit, but markedly worse fit than models B or C. This large 
difference in BIC scores is reason to prefer either model B or C over A (Raftery 1995:135).  
Table 12: Model fit statistics 
Model RMSEA CFI TLI χ2 DF χ2 
pval 
BIC 
LCM of RSO with no covariates 0.021 0.996 0.995 87.734 46 .0002 -261.63 
        
with  Sr@0;        
(A†) Attendance as causal covariate 0.029 0.995 0.993 215.298 80 0.000 -392.29 
(B†) Attendance as effect indicator 0.030 0.993 0.992 275.192 97 0.000 -461.51 
(C†) Bivariate latent curve model 0.028 0.994 0.993 246.462 95 0.000 -475.05 
        
Attendance as continuous, with  Sr@0;† 
(A††) Attendance as causal covariate 0.027 0.989 0.985 194.566 78 0.000 -397.83 
(B††) Attendance as effect indicator 0.027 0.988 0.985 202.523 81 0.000 -412.66 
(C††) Bivariate latent curve model 0.027 0.988 0.985 205.781 83 0.000 -424.59 
        
N=1988 in all models 
†: Versions of models A-C estimated with religious attendance treated as a continuous rather than ordered 
categorical variable. 
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 In Model B, factor loadings for religious attendance on RSO are moderate (.716, nearly 
the same as the Big Bang indicator), and r-squares vary between  .335 and .391, meaning in an 
unconstrained model, the RSO, Slope, and Intercept latent variables explain roughly a third of 
the variance in religious attendance measures; this while the error term for the religious 
attendance measure at each time point is allowed to co-vary with the error terms for the 
attendance measures at the other two time points. 
 In Model C, several relationships are evident. Both RSO and religious attendance have 
significant slope means with absolute values greater than zero, although Sr is negative (-.023), 
while Sa is positive (.020). This means that in the unconstrained bivariate curve model, RSO 
tends to decrease slightly over time while religious attendance tends to increase slightly. 
Additionally, these slopes are uncorrelated - as the slope for RSO is essentially a constant 
(variance indistinguishable from zero), the slope for religious attendance (a random variable) 
cannot correlate with it. R-squares for the religious attendance indicators are much larger in 
Model C, ranging from .780 to .825, meaning that initial levels explain roughly four fifths of the 
variance in the religious attendance measures. Arbitrating between models B and C is 
straightforward, the difference in BIC scores of 13.54 presents strong evidence to prefer Model C 
over Model B. 
5 - Model C with covariates 
Covariates 
 In the section that follows, the best fitting of the three models presented in Figure 7 is re-
estimated with a set of demographic and socio-economic controls as exogenous covariates. 
These covariates are measured at the first time point (2006) and allowed to influence the slope 
and intercept latent variables for religious attendance and the intercept variable for RSO, rather 
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than RSO (or religious attendance) directly. As the slope for RSO (Sr) was effectively a constant, 
covariates were not allowed to influence it. 
 Respondent education is represented by a variable constructed from a series of questions 
about the respondent’s education, and is measured in years. Parent education is the largest value 
of either mother’s or father’s education, in years. Race is represented by dummy variables for 
Black non-hispanic, White non-hispanic, other race non-hispanic, and Hispanic, with white non-
hispanic as the reference group.  
 Some scholars have written about the connections between the political right in the 
United States and an anti-science (Gauchat 2012; Mooney 2005) or even anti-intellectual 
orientation (Gauchat 2010; Hofstadter 1963), or that science itself may have a left bias (Gross, 
Medvetz, and Russell 2011; Gross 2013). Because the 2006 GSS panel data spans a presidential 
election year, it is plausible that political views may influence an identity-infused (and politically 
charged) dimension of knowledge like RSO. Political views are measured by a response to the 
question:   
“We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. I'm going to show you 
a seven-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged 
from extremely liberal--point 1--to extremely conservative-- point 7. Where would you 
place yourself on this scale?” 
 
With responses ranging from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. 
 Also included as covariates are variables representing residing in the US South and size 
of place. Since there is a concentration of conservative Protestants in the Southern US, and in 
rural parts of the Southern US in particular, these covariates were included to disaggregate the 
rural and region effects from conservative Protestant affiliation. A dichotomous variable 
representing remained in the Southern US region since age 16 was generated from generated by 
coding 1 for southern region at age 16 from the “reg16” variable in the GSS, and remaining in 
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either the same city or same state using the “mob16” variable. The variable “xnorcsiz” 18 was 
included as a measure of rural/urbanness, with 10 categories ranging from a city with greater 
than 250,000 residents to “open country” (Smith et al. 2010). 
 Religious tradition is represented by a slightly modified version of the RELTRAD coding 
scheme (Steensland et al. 2000; Woodberry et al. 2012), with dummy variables for the following 
traditions: Conservative Protestant, Mainline Protestant, Catholic, other religion (including 
Jewish), with no affiliation as the reference category (16.89% of the 2006 panel data report no 
affiliation). In part to deal with collinearity issues with the black Protestant dummy variable and 
the black race dummy variable, the black Protestant group was split and reallocated to the 
conservative and mainline Protestant groups, according to the coding used by Ellison and 
colleagues (Ellison et al. 2011)19. Versions of the full model were estimated with the traditional 
RELTRAD groups, with similar results. 
 Other covariates include age (in 2006; in years), and gender as a dichotomous variable. 
                                                
18 “XNORCSIZ” was coded as follows: “Within an SMSA [Standard Metropolitan Statistical 
Area] and a large central city (over 250,000) = 1, a medium size central city (50,000 to 250,000) 
= 2, a suburb of a large central city = 3, a suburb of a medium size central city = 4, an 
unincorporated area of a large central city (division, township, etc) = 5, an unincorporated area of 
a medium central city = 6, Not within an SMSA,  (within a county) and a small city (10,000 to 
49,999) = 7, a town or village (2,500 to 9,999) = 8, an incorporated area less than 2,500 or an 
unincorporated area of 1,000 to 2,499 = 9, open country within larger civil 10 divisions, eg, 
township, division = 10” (Smith et al. 2010:184) 
19 Following (Ellison et al. 2011), the conservative Protestant group contained members of the 
following denominations: “Among the groups categorized as conservative Protestant were 
Southern Baptist, most other Baptist except for American or ‘‘Northern’’ Baptist, Nazarene, 
Church of Christ, Church of God in Christ, Christian and Missionary Alliance, all Pentecostal, 
Holiness, and Apostolic churches, Assemblies of God, Full Gospel Fellowship, independent 
Bible churches, and all other fundamentalist and evangelical groups.” (Ellison et al. 2011:951; 
Steensland et al. 2000) 
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Parameter Estimates 
 Table 13 presents results from the constrained bivariate LCM, with exogenous 
demographic and socio-economic covariates influencing the latent intercept for RSO and the 
latent slope and intercept variable for religious attendance. In this model, the variance for the 
slope term for RSO (Sr) is constrained to zero as in previous models. As the slope for RSO is a 
constant value, covariates were not specified as influencing it. Paths from exogenous covariates 
to the intercept for RSO and slope and intercept for religious attendance are freely estimated, and 
their coefficients may be found in Table 13. Overall fit for the model presented in Table 13 is 
excellent. 
Table 13: Parameter estimates for bivariate latent curve model with time invariant covariates 
 Ir    Ia   Sa   
 Est. Est/S.E. Est. Est/S.E. Est. Est/S.E. 
Political views 0.151 8.497 *** 0.100 5.547 *** 0.008 1.300 
 Educational Attainment -0.056 -6.133 *** 0.032 3.222 ** -0.001 -0.268 
 Parent Education -0.029 -4.138 *** 0.000 0.006 
 
-0.001 -0.225 
 Female 0.303 6.283 *** 0.204 3.956 *** 0.045 2.504 * 
Black (non Hispanic) 0.672 9.104 *** 0.354 4.570 *** 0.049 1.697 + 
Other Race (non Hispanic) 0.039 0.510 
 
0.041 0.477 
 
0.021 0.726 
 Hispanic 0.008 1.247 
 
0.008 1.230 
 
-0.004 -1.749 + 
Size of place (Urban/Rural) 0.039 4.549 *** 0.016 1.741 + 0.002 0.793 
 Remained in Southern region 0.168 2.746 ** -0.022 -0.334 
 
0.069 2.821 ** 
Conservative Protestant affiliation 1.017 11.637 *** 1.600 20.281 *** -0.091 -3.073 ** 
Mainline and Black Protestant affil. 0.400 5.290 *** 1.167 13.310 *** -0.116 -3.884 *** 
Catholic affiliation 0.365 5.244 *** 1.124 13.684 *** -0.068 -2.201 * 
Other Religious affiliation 0.282 2.737 ** 1.087 10.059 *** -0.074 -2.316 * 
Age -0.001 -0.736 
 
0.001 0.513 
 
0.001 2.008 * 
R-squares          
Ir .579         
Ia .388         
Sa .273         
R-squares for RSO range from .800-.902 across all three time points, for religious attendance from .802-.830 
N=1744; χ2 = 435.911, DF = 275; RMSEA = .020; CFI = .987; TLI = .984; BIC = -1616.672 
 
 Conservative Protestants have markedly higher initial levels of RSO than non-affiliated 
persons, net of other controls and any error covariance between intercept and slope terms of RSO 
and religious attendance. Because the path from the intercept term to RSO at each time point is 
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set to 1, the intercept term is scaled to the same metric as the RSO latent variables, each of which 
is scaled to the GSS item about evolution. While both the intercept term and the individual RSO 
latent variables at each time point have variances different than that of their scaling item, the 
coefficients may still be interpreted in terms of the scaling items. In this case, a coefficient of 
around 1 for the intercept of RSO regressed on conservative Protestant affiliation means that 
respondents that report conservative Protestant affiliation tend to have an initial level of RSO of 
one unit higher than unaffiliated persons (the reference group). A unit increase in RSO 
corresponds to a comparable increase in the unobserved continuous response variable underlying 
the indicators of RSO (the observed indicators themselves are categorical rather than 
continuous), modified by the factor loadings. Other religious affiliation dichotomous category 
coefficients may be interpreted in a similar way. 
 In the case of the intercept or initial level of religious attendance, conservative Protestants 
again have a sizable effect. Interpreting coefficients for models with religious attendance treated 
as an ordered categorical variable are difficult to interpret20, however in the continuous model 
(that is, a model where religious attendance is treated as a continuous rather than ordered 
categorical variable) conservative Protestants tended to have an initial level of religious 
attendance 3.5 categories greater than nonaffiliated persons - this is a difference of going from 
“Never” to halfway between “Several times a year” and “About once a month” at the lower end 
of the range, and between “About once a month” and “2-3 times a month” to “several times a 
week” at the upper end of the range.  
                                                
20 From the standardized coefficients (STDY, not presented here), the initial level of the 
underlying response variable for religious attendance increases by 1.482 standard deviations for 
conservative Protestants relative to non-affiliated persons. As religious attendance is a nine-
category measure ranging from “never” to “more than once per week” this effect is smaller in 
overall effect than that on initial levels of RSO. 
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 Both female and black respondents have greater initial levels of RSO and religious 
attendance, and those reporting a more conservative political orientation also have larger initial 
levels of RSO and attendance, a one unit increase in the seven-level political attitudes measure 
corresponds to a .151 unit increase in initial levels of RSO and a .1 unit increase in initial levels 
of religious attendance (again, this a much larger effect on RSO than on attendance). Educational 
attainment (in years) has a negative effect on initial levels of RSO, each year of education 
corresponds to an initial value of RSO .056 units lower. Education has a slight positive effect on 
initial levels of religious attendance, however significance is marginal for the sample size. 
 The slope latent variable for RSO (Sr) had a mean in unconstrained models; this is no 
longer significant in the constrained model. This means that including the time invariant 
covariates as constraints negated the constant slight negative slope of RSO over time. As the 
intercept and residual variance for the slope in religious attendance are insignificant in the 
constrained model, rates of change are fully explained by the time invariant covariates. For 
example, Protestants (both conservative and mainline) are predicted to have slight negative 
slopes for attendance over time; females are predicted to have positive slopes. 
 R-squares for the latent intercepts and slope term may be interpreted as in standard OLS 
regressions, in this case 57.9% of the variance in the intercept term for RSO is explained by the 
added time-invariant covariates, 38.8% of the random intercept for religious attendance, and 
27.3% of the variance for the random slope for religious attendance is explained by the time 
invariant covariates. 
6 - Sensitivity Analyses 
 I estimated versions of the constrained model without religious affiliation categories, with 
similar results, though in this model (results not presented here) no covariates had significant 
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paths to the slope of religious attendance (Sa), suggesting that any real variation for rates of 
change in attendance are closely related to religious affiliation, likely due in part to the greater 
rates of attendance reported by those reporting affiliation than those not. 
 Following the analyses in (Hayward and Krause 2013), I broke the panel sample was into 
three life stages at the 2006 time point; under 25, 25-65, and over 65. While the over 65 model 
failed to converge due to insufficient covariance coverage (empty cells), the unconstrained mid 
life and early life models had similar results to the unconstrained full model, although the slope 
means were insignificant in the early life model, likely due to a small number of observations 
(N=167). 
 I have estimated versions of the initial three models with alternate recodings of the 
religious attendance variable. First, two attempts to dichotomize it were made, one with the cut 
point at never attend (thus resulting in a measure of ever having attended a religious service over 
the past year), and the second with the threshold at less than once per month, resulting in a 
frequent/infrequent attender measure. Results were similar to those presented here, with Model C 
(the bivariate LCM) the preferred model. Overall fit was poor relative to the ordinal measure. 
However, in models using either dichotomization, Model A was preferred to Model B - a 
reversal of the trend with the original ordinal categorical measure of religious attendance, 
although Model C remained the overall preferred model in all cases. 
 I also attempted a continuous coding of religious attendance, where I imputed reasonable 
values for each category (ranging from 0-100). Models with the imputed values failed to 
converge, so initial arbitration between the three models was impossible. Models with the 
variable treated as continuous as-is fit similarly to the ordinal models, with model fit leading to 
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the same model arbitration decisions as the ordinal model (Model B preferable to Model A, 
Model C preferable to both, models marked with † in Table 12). 
 It is also worth noting that the fastest growing religious affiliation group is the “nones” or 
those with no affiliation (The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life Project 2012). To test 
whether treating non-affiliated persons as the reference group were partially driving results, I 
estimated a version of Model C with covariates with conservative Protestant affiliation as the 
reference category, and non-affiliated persons as a dichotomous control along with other 
religious affiliation variables. Results were similar to those presented in Table 13. 
7 - Discussion  
 In arbitration between the three potential models, Model C, the bivariate latent curve 
model, was selected as the best fit to the data. This model includes a latent curve for both RSO 
and religious attendance. In Model C without covariates, there appeared to be very slight means 
for both RSO and religious attendance, that is the sample as a whole had a slight negative slope 
for RSO over time, and a slight positive slope for religious attendance. Once additional 
constraints are added to the bivariate latent curve model (in the form of time invariant 
covariates), these overall trends in change over time for both RSO and religious attendance are 
no longer present. In the case of RSO, there is essentially zero variance in the slope term, and the 
mean (or intercept, in the constrained model) is effectively zero. This slope term is essentially a 
constant in the unconstrained model, and thus the time invariant covariates were not specified as 
influencing it. In the case of the slope for religious attendance, it had a slight positive mean in 
unconstrained models, and this is largely explained by the demographic and religious affiliation 
controls, meaning there is little or no overall trend in change in religious attendance over time, a 
finding in line with other work on adults in midlife (which make up the bulk of the GSS sample). 
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 These results mean individual differences contribute to stable levels of RSO, independent 
of time invariant covariates such as education or conservative Protestant affiliation and net of 
any shared disturbance in the error terms for the latent intercept terms Ir and Ia. This stability of 
RSO over time suggests it may be considered a durable disposition (Bourdieu 1984) or as a 
marker of a highly salient identity (Owens et al. 2010; Stryker and Burke 2000; Stryker 2008) - 
identities with high salience may be less likely to change. Respondents are signaling group 
membership by their responses to the RSO indicators (Snow and Anderson 1987; Tajfel and 
Turner 1979; Tajfel 1982), and the consistency of that signaling suggests constancy in that group 
membership and identity. 
 These results suggest that the levels of educational attainment, conservative Protestant 
affiliation, frequency of religious attendance, and other covariates influence initial levels of RSO 
but do not affect the stability of RSO in individuals over time. Respondents that report 
Conservative Protestant affiliation tend to both attend religious services more frequently than 
non-affiliated persons (and other religious affiliation groups) and hold RSO more strongly than 
other groups. Black and female respondents also have higher initial levels of RSO and religious 
attendance. If true, this means that the relationship between these covariates and RSO may be set 
or crystallized early in life. Or, in the case of conservative Protestant affiliation and religious 
attendance, their relationship with RSO may be determined or partially determined by other 
unobserved variables from early life. Educational attainment has a significant negative effect on 
RSO, conservative Protestant affiliation, and political views each have a highly significant 
positive effect.  
 There is a significant covariance in the disturbance or error terms for the intercepts of 
RSO and religious attendance (Ir and Ia), suggesting one or more of the following: (1) they 
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influence each other, either one-way or (2) in a reverse causal relationship, or (3) unobserved 
variables influence both RSO and religious attendance. Further work is required to examine the 
nature of the association between RSO and religious attendance. 
Limitations 
 Further studies are required to examine the relationship between religious attendance and 
RSO in detail, and additionally to explicate the nature of the links between educational 
attainment and religious attendance (independent of religious affiliation). While this article finds 
that RSO has an overall slight negative trajectory of change, one limitation is the time span of 
panel data. While most adults have completed their educational trajectories, four years may not 
be enough time to allow for the life course changes in religious attendance to manifest their 
effects on RSO. To fully explore these linkages, panel data covering a larger time span is 
required. A further limitation of this study is that data are restricted to adults. It seems likely 
from the slight slope means in the unconstrained model that early life experiences have strong 
effects on the overall levels of RSO and religious attendance, if not on trajectories of change.  
 Models presented here included controls for demographic and socio-economic covariates, 
however one implicit assumption is that the overall model structure is close to the true model 
across these groups. Future work may benefit from analyses that disaggregate these groups and 
test whether or not the true model structure differs between groups. 
Conclusions 
 This article has tested three likely latent curve models representing the relationship 
between RSO and religious attendance over time. Results show support for the bivariate latent 
curve model, or the model where both RSO and religious attendance have separate latent curve 
trajectories, with strong associations between initial levels of both RSO and religious service 
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attendance. This article has also demonstrated evidence for general stability of RSO over time, 
and while there is a very slight downward trend in RSO (likely related to age), there are no group 
or individual effects influencing this trajectory. Results from all three models suggest that the 
linkages between RSO attitudes and self-report religious service attendance are set early in the 
life course, and future work should explore these linkages more deeply. 
 The rejection of evolution and related ideas has major implications for the US general 
public. Support for including intelligent design and creationism in school curricula is likely 
bolstered by high rates of rejection of evolution in the United States, and as parent and 
respondent educational attainment were among the few covariates to lead to a reduction in RSO 
(along with a more liberal political orientation, itself associated with educational attainment), any 
changes to primary and secondary school science curricula could lead to drastic long-term 
demographic changes in rates of acceptance or rejection of evolution and associated ideas. 
Further, high rates of rejection of evolution likely result in a large population of potentially 
motivated actors in social movements related to the evolution debate (i.e. for groups such as 
Answers in Genesis and the Discovery Institute that push for the introduction of creationism and 
intelligent design in school curricula). Moreover, in a certain sense, high rates of the rejection of 
evolution and related ideas (and the collective identity that indicates) may in itself be considered 
a successful outcome of such movements (Polletta and Jasper 2001:296). The ways in which this 
motivated public may be mobilized for closely-related conservative, religious issues merits 
further study. 
 Given evidence of the spillover effects between contested and uncontested forms of 
knowledge (Roos 2013), high rates of RSO could lead some to avoid not only scientific 
disciplines related to evolution (evolutionary biology, genetics, human anthropology), but may 
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lead to avoidance of other scientific disciplines with a less clear link to evolution as well. Such 
avoidances could play a key, silent role in the shape of future STEM shortages, and may help 
explain the leaky pipeline problem in STEM education (Blickenstaff 2005). 
 Another area where rates of rejection of evolution (and associated ideas) in the US public 
is of critical importance is science funding. The erosion of support for basic science funding 
relating to biology, human anthropology, genetics, and other areas where evolution is a central 
paradigm is a serious concern. Such erosion could slow down advancements in medical 
technology and otherwise negatively impact healthcare and quality of life for the US public, as 
well as undercutting a major branch of study that leads to understanding humans and our place 
relative to other species. This understanding of humans and their relations to other species would 
be considered by many in the scientific sphere to be a public good, and threats to funding 
research in these areas is a threat to the scientific enterprise. 
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CHAPTER V: CONCLUSIONS 
 
1 - Disparities in Science Knowledge 
 I began this document with the premise that high rates of science knowledge in the 
United States is a public good. However, as Gauchat (2012:168) argues, “science has always 
been politicized” (emphasis in original), and that politicization leads to reduced trust in science 
as an institution. This implies that scientific knowledge (as a product of that institution) may be 
similarly mistrusted. Disparities in science knowledge, whether due to mistrust, poor education, 
or an epistemological conflict with religion (Evans and Evans 2008) may have serious 
implications. Low rates of science knowledge may result lack of support for public science 
funding. The events surrounding the political science NSF funding controversy provide some 
sobering evidence of the likelihood of vulnerability of some areas of science to political attack. 
Low rates of acceptance of certain areas of scientific discovery such as evolution (that I argue are 
also areas that religion has an authoritative claim) can serve as public support for organizations 
pressing to include creationism and intelligent design in school science curricula. Further, high 
rates of rejection of evolution may serve as a rallying collective identity (Polletta and Jasper 
2001) that could be mobilized towards other, allied conservative religious goals. Finally, 
understanding the demographics of science knowledge may be necessary to understand the 
potential future shortage of STEM workers, and is almost certainly important to understand the 
“leaky pipeline” (Blickenstaff 2005) for STEM education in the present. 
 This dissertation makes several contributions to understandings of the intersection of 
science and religion. First, while it is generally known that specific areas of intersection between 
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science and religion are likely far more contentious than others, the ways in which positions in 
those contested areas may influence attitudes in other areas were poorly understood. Second, 
many researchers are using the NSF science knowledge scale in such a way as to package in 
error and religious bias into the scale, and I have provided suggestions for alternate ways to use 
the scale to avoid this. Lastly, religious attendance is closely associated with the rejection of 
evolution (even net of religious affiliation), however religious attendance and rejection of 
science knowledge each has a unique trajectory of change. I have shown evidence in Chapter 3 
that the rejection of evolution and related ideas contributes to lower levels of science knowledge, 
independent of educational attainment - a finding that is in agreement with arguments about the 
weak effects of education on science literacy made by others (Bauer, Allum, and Miller 2007), 
demographic covariates, and religious affiliation and attendance. This independent effect is 
present for both forms of uncontested science knowledge identified in Chapter 2 (physical and 
life sciences). The remainder of this chapter will detail more specific findings from the previous 
chapters, followed by a discussion of limitations of the analyses documented in this dissertation, 
with some suggestions for future avenues of research. 
2 - Measurement of Scientific Knowledge 
 Chapter 2 presented a measurement analysis of the NSF science knowledge scale present 
in the GSS as well as the NSF surveys dataset. This chapter had two key findings: (1) current 
understandings of the structure that underlies the NSF science knowledge scale are flawed, and 
(2) some indicators present in the scale may be poor measures of science knowledge. The first of 
these findings is important because many researchers using the NSF science knowledge scale 
tend to treat it most frequently as a summed scale (see Gauchat 2010; Sherkat 2011). Treating 
the scale in this way makes two implicit assumptions: that the scale measures a single dimension 
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of overall science knowledge, that each item in the scale measures that item equally (without 
error). Typically, when the scale is used in this way, cronbach’s alpha as a test of reliability is 
reported, however alpha for the scale tends to be low (below .74 for GSS waves 2006-2012), 
suggesting that the inter-item covariance is not close to equal across all items.   In addition, 
Cronbach’s alpha assumes a unidimensional structure with equally reliable items and neither 
assumption is consistent with my results.  Moreover, in CFAs allowing for measurement error of 
individual items but a single dimension result in poor fit - that is, specifying a single underlying 
factor, but allowing each indicator to have a varying amount of error (which is a more liberal set 
of assumptions than those made with a typical summed scale) still results in poor fit. 
 An alternate understanding of the structures underlying the scale comes from Miller 
(Miller 1983, 1987, 1998), where two dimensions underlie the scale: a general fact-based 
knowledge dimension and a methodological dimension. In Chapter 2 I tested model structures 
corresponding to this theoretical specification, but found that a structure that allowed for topical 
area dimensions had better fit. Specifically, a structure where the two topical areas of physical 
and life sciences underlie the scale is closer to the true model than either the unidimensional 
structure or Miller’s two dimensional structure. 
 The second key finding is that several of the items in the NSF scale tap religious beliefs 
rather than science. Items about human evolution, the big bang, and continental drift all had a 
significant set of correlated disturbances in the single-factor model or either of the two-factor 
models (i.e. Miller’s or the one I proposed). Based on a series of additional models, I argued that 
these items were measuring a religious dimension, and moreover that the evolution and bigbang 
items were insignificantly related to the other dimensions of science knowledge (physical and 
life sciences). Through the addition of a biblical literacy item, I tested whether this dimension 
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represented religious beliefs, and item r-squares and between-factor correlations changed little. 
This was evidence that the dimension measured by the evolution, big bang, and continental drift 
items was already of a religious nature, as the addition of a religious indicator constrained to 
load on this factor and only on this factor did not markedly influence other parameters in the 
model. The dimension is not purely one of science knowledge (at least not of uncontested 
science knowledge). Rather, I theorized it was measuring the acceptance or rejection of evolution 
and related ideas. This led me to the analyses performed in Chapter 3. 
3 - Contested Knowledge 
 Chapter 3 presented the concept of contested knowledge, and made use of evolution and 
related ideas as an exemplar case. In this chapter, I provide evidence for the claim that 
conservative forms of Protestantism are associated with reduced levels of science knowledge, 
though this effect is mediated by educational attainment and rejection of scientific orthodoxy 
(RSO). The indirect effect of conservative Protestantism is persistent and negative for both 
physical and life sciences, and in both cases the path from conservative Protestant affiliation 
through RSO is the one with the largest effect. This finding contributes to the debate over the 
existence of a negative influence of conservative Protestant affiliation on science knowledge 
(Evans 2011; Sherkat 2011) and to our understanding of the covariates of science knowledge 
more generally.  
 What is particularly striking about the indirect effects of conservative Protestantism on 
science knowledge is how little of this indirect effect flows through educational variables. 
While the educational attainment path is of moderate size for life sciences facts, the path through 
number of college science courses is very small, and neither path is large for physical sciences.  
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This means that whatever the negative influence of conservative Protestantism on science 
knowledge, it does not appear to be working primarily through reductions in educational 
attainment or through avoiding college-level science coursework (information on which specific 
courses were taken is unavailable). This partially supports the claim made in Chapter 2 that RSO 
is a dimension about the rejection of evolution and related ideas, not about lack of awareness of 
evolution. It is extremely unlikely that, were the conservative Protestant effects that flow through 
RSO measuring lack of awareness, educational attainment would not also be a factor. This is not 
to say that educational attainment is not a significant predictor of RSO or science knowledge (it 
is). However, the nature of the negative influence conservative Protestant affiliation has on either 
form of science knowledge (physical or life sciences) appears to be one of active rejection rather 
than lack of awareness. The primary path for indirect influence from conservative Protestantism 
does not flow through educational variables. Though not presented in Chapter 3, religious 
attendance has an overall similar pattern of indirect effects on science knowledge (i.e. flowing 
mostly through RSO rather than educational variables), though overall total effects of religious 
attendance on science knowledge are small. 
 Another important finding from Chapter 3 is the presence of direct effects from RSO to 
both forms of science knowledge. Net of socio-demographic, educational, and religious controls, 
these direct effects are evidence of spillover effects. At equal levels of educational attainment, 
number of college science courses taken, parent education, religious attendance, age, and 
identical religious affiliation, those that hold RSO more strongly also have lower levels of 
science knowledge. The model specification in Chapter 3 includes directional paths between 
RSO and physical and life sciences knowledge. That is, influence is specified to flow from RSO 
to science knowledge, rather than the reverse. An alternate model where these arrows are 
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reversed was also estimated, and as these two models contain the same observed variables and 
use the same sample, their BIC scores may be compared for model arbitration. The model 
presented in Chapter 3 was the preferred model, meaning that directional paths from RSO to 
science knowledge appears to be a better approximation of the true model than the reverse. 
 Net of controls, direct negative influences of RSO on science knowledge is evidence of 
the rejection or devaluation of the rules and criteria for assessing truth claims within the 
contested knowledge area of evolution and related ideas spilling over to uncontested areas. This 
results in reduced levels of uncontested science knowledge for those who hold a position in the 
contested area of origins that is in conflict with that of mainstream science. 
4 - Rejection of Scientific Orthodoxy 
 In Chapter 4 I present a series of latent curve models (LCMs) to test the nature of the 
relation between RSO and religious attendance. Relying on BIC score differences (Raftery 1995) 
I select  the bivariate LCM to be the preferred model. I then re-estimate the bivariate LCM with a 
set of socio-demographic and religious covariates, and interpret their effects on latent intercept 
and slope terms from the bivariate LCM. In part because survey measures of religious attendance 
may be capturing religious behaviors as well as religious identities (Brenner 2011; Hadaway et 
al. 1993, 1998; Marler and Hadaway 1999) or desirability bias (Marcum 1999), it was unclear 
how religious attendance should relate to a dimension measuring a knowledge identity like RSO. 
While all three models had reasonable fit, the bivariate LCM fit best, suggesting that simpler 
models where attendance influences RSO or the reverse may be inaccurate. In the bivariate 
LCM, the slope term for RSO was constrained to have zero variance, effectively making it a 
constant. Thus, the slope for religious attendance could not correlate with it. The random 
intercept terms, which represented initial levels of RSO or religious attendance were correlated 
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(at .613), which suggests that events in early life likely contribute both to level of rejection of 
evolution and related ideas and reported frequency of religious attendance. 
 In the bivariate LCM with added covariates, the coefficients for covariates on the 
intercept term of RSO may be interpreted similarly to a standard regression. Especially so in this 
case, as including the full set of covariates result in even the mean level of the slope for RSO (Sr) 
becoming insignificant. This means that net of controls (especially age), there is no change over 
time in RSO. Coupled with the results from the bivariate LCM without covariates, these results 
suggest that individual effects contribute to stability in RSO over time. Similarly, only a very 
small positive change trajectory for religious attendance is found, which is a finding that is in 
general agreement with other work investigating the life course patterns of religious attendance 
(Hayward and Krause 2013; Petts 2009; Schwadel 2011; Uecker et al. 2007).  
 Conservative Protestantism has the largest effect on initial levels of RSO (Ir), followed by 
black, all other religious affiliation categories (non-affiliated was the reference group), and 
female. These effects were much larger than educational attainment or parent educational 
attainment, and in fact political views had a larger effect than either individual or parent 
educational attainment, with politically conservative respondents tending to have higher overall 
initial levels of RSO.  Teasing apart these specific findings may require further research. 
5 - General Conclusions 
 Among the primary goals of this dissertation was a better understanding of factors that 
contribute to disparities in science knowledge in the United States. Because of the implications 
of low rates of science knowledge outlined above (lack of support for basic research, a ready 
base to be mobilized towards other social movement goals, and a potential STEM worker 
shortage), understanding factors that may contribute to lower rates matter. Further, an 
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understanding of how different factors may contribute to disparities in various subareas of 
science knowledge differently. In general, for the US public, education (both in terms of years of 
attainment and amount of postsecondary science coursework taken) is one of the strongest 
predictors of science knowledge, but it is far from the whole story. Sex and race also have potent 
effects, with both females and black respondents having overall lower levels of physical sciences 
knowledge. Females tend to have higher levels of life sciences knowledge, and further work is 
needed to determine whether this is truly a difference in group means or simply an artifact of 
sex-based differential item functioning. 
 The issue of disparities in rates of acceptance of evolution (and related ideas) is more 
complex. Because evolution is politicized in ways that uncontested forms of science knowledge 
are not, it is unlikely that high rates of rejection can be “cured” with more education, or even 
education of a different quality (Bauer et al. 2007). Despite significant direct effects on RSO of 
educational attainment and amount of college science coursework in Chapter 3 and significant 
effects of educational attainment on the intercept term for RSO (Ir) in Chapter 4, these effects are 
small relative to the effects of religious covariates (particularly conservative Protestant 
affiliation), and as shown in Chapter 4, even political views had a larger effect than educational 
attainment. 
 The results in Chapters 3 and 4 serve to underscore one of the main recommendations 
from Chapter 2: that researchers interested in science knowledge generally must take care to 
avoid including concepts that have a high political or religious valence, as doing so almost 
certainly introduces bias into any scales researchers may create. Given the critical nature of 
current issues in science education (namely, pressure from movement groups to include 
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creationism or intelligent design in school science curricula), including these high-valence items 
in measures of science knowledge could bias results in unpredictable ways. 
6 - Limitations and Future Research 
 Building from these conclusions, I propose several new directions of research. The first 
and perhaps most exciting is to carry the contested knowledge concept to new conflict areas: 
climate change and vaccines. These make excellent comparison cases because while I theorize 
the processes will be much the same (including the presence of spillover effects), these are 
examples of contested issues at opposite ends of the political spectrum. Climate change denial is 
seen as a position of the extreme right (though one with less of a religious aspect than evolution), 
and the vaccines/autism link is a debate less clearly associated with the far right. If the 
mechanisms of spillover are similar in these new cases as in the case of evolution, that would be 
compelling evidence for the universal nature of contested knowledge. 
 One limitation of the latent curve analyses presented in Chapter 4 is that it is restricted to 
US adults. Additionally, the span of time is short. Longitudinal data including data from early 
life would enhance the analyses in Chapters 4 and 3, and at the least allow temporal ordering to 
settle some issues where causal direction is unclear. Do individuals formulate positions on 
evolution in early life? If so, how early? Better longitudinal data may also help to explain the 
nature of the relation between religious affiliation and rejection of evolution, as the current 
analyses can ultimately only point to associations without making strong causal arguments. 
 Another important limitation is the NSF science knowledge scale itself. Better measures 
of science knowledge could be devised (indeed, there is a module of what some might argue are 
better indicators in the 2008 GSS), and better items would undoubtedly lead to finer grained 
distinctions between dimensions of science knowledge, as well as the precise nature of their 
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covariance with dimensions of religiosity. There has been the beginning of a renaissance of sorts 
in studies of the intersection of science and religion in sociology (Ecklund 2010; Evans and 
Evans 2008; Evans 2013), and more detailed measures of science knowledge in the United States 
can only further the expansion of this exciting new area of research. 
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APPENDIX ONE: MEASURES OF MODEL FIT 
 
 The models discussed below were estimated in Mplus versions 6.12 and 7 (Muthén and 
Muthén 2011), and indicators were treated as categorical dependent variables. Due to large 
sample sizes in the exploratory and test samples, the chi-square statistic is a poor indicator of 
model fit (Bollen 1989; Kline 2011). Other model fit indices reported here include the Root 
Mean Error of Approximation (RMSEA), which adjusts for parsimony (or favors less-complex 
models; see Kline, 2011:204) and works best with larger samples. The RMSEA approaches 0, 
and typically values less than .05 or .1 are considered good fit, though (Hu and Bentler 1999) 
suggest .05 or lower is more appropriate. The Comparative Fit Index (CFI), which assesses 
model fit compared to the baseline model, or a model that assumes no covariances between 
observed variables (Kline 2011:196), and the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) both approach 1, with 
minimally acceptable fit being values above 0.9 (Tucker and Lewis 1973) and values above 0.95 
suggested for good fit (Hu and Bentler 1999), additionally the TLI has the capacity to detect 
overfit (values over 1, overfit indicates problems with model structure). The final fit index 
reported, the Schwarz-modified Bayesian Information Critereon (BIC) is both a standalone fit 
index as well as a comparative one (Schwarz 1978). The Schwarz-modified BIC is calculated 
with the formula: χ2 - df*nl(N), or the chi-square test statistic minus degrees of freedom 
multiplied by the natural log of the sample size. This fit statistic penalizes model complexity and 
it is devised to give a comparison of the saturated to hypothesized model, or to compare any two 
models. BICs are comparable between models, but only models using the same observed 
variables. Schwarz-modified BIC values less than zero show varying support for the model vs 
the saturated model, and when the observed variables are the same, two models may be 
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compared by the difference in their BIC scores (Raftery 1995:139). A combination of available 
fit statistics was used to interpret model fit, rather than any individual statistic. 
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APPENDIX TWO: ALTERNATE MODELS FROM CHAPTER TWO 
 
Additional Science Knowledge Indicators 
 The 2010 wave of the GSS includes a new item in the NSF science scale: “tomatoes”. 
This item, which is about the presence of genes in regular (versus gene-modified) tomatoes, 
seems an ideal indicator for the life sciences dimension. To test the suitability of the “tomatoes” 
item, it was added to the final model (E) as well as the Miller two-dimensional model (F) for the 
2010 wave of the GSS. Model fit was similar to previous models in both cases, and the r-squared 
for the “tomatoes” item in all models was good (ranging from .376 in Model F to .428 in Model 
E).  
Denominational Affiliation 
 To test if the YEW dimension (and the YEW dimension plus the “bible” item) simply 
mirrors respondent’s religious affiliation, Model E was refit to the exploratory sample with 
denominational affiliation as an exogenous variable (a MIMIC model; see (Kano 2001; Kline 
2005) ). Denominational affiliation was coded according to the scheme used in (Ellison et al. 
2011)21. Dummy variables for conservative Protestant, other Protestant, Catholic, and no religion 
were included, with all other responses to the “relig16” variable the reference category22.  
 In this model, correlations between latent factors are little-changed from those reported in 
Table 4, with or without the “bible” variable included as part of YEW: PFact with YEW 
correlate at -.603 without and -.6 with the “bible” item; LSFact and YEW correlate at -.38 
                                                
21 A model with exogenous variables created following Steensland et al. (2000) was also 
estimated, with similar results. 
22 The “relig16” variable was generated from the following question: “In what religion were you 
raised?”, those that responded “Protestant” were asked the follow up question: “What specific 
denomination is that, if any?” (Davis, Smith, and Marsden 2009; Smith et al. 2010). For more on 
these categories and group coding, see Steensland et al., (2000), for more on the specific coding 
strategy used here, see also Ellison, Musick, & Holden (2011). 
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without and -.37 with the “bible” item; and PFact and LSFact correlate at .822 without and .819 
with the “bible” item. The explained variance for all three latent variables is low (YEW at .076 
without and .126 with the “bible” variable).  
 To further explore the effects of denomination on the factor structure, a multiple group 
analysis (MGA) was performed using the exploratory sample, splitting the sample into 
Protestants and others. In this comparison, holding factor loadings constant yielded a significant 
χ2 (p=.063), suggesting that the two groups can be pooled for the purposes of estimating factor 
loadings. These two tests both suggest that while Protestants are more likely to hold a Young 
Earth Worldview than others (and conservative Protestants more so than other Protestants), the 
distinctness of YEW from either PFact or LSFact is not purely a function of religious 
denominational group effects. 
Table 14: Model Fit, alternate models from Chapter 2 
Model n RMSEA CFI TLI Chi2 DF BIC 
Model H* (E -boyorgrl) 908 0.021 0.992 0.989 67.799 49 -265.95† 
Model I* 908 0.022 0.989 0.985 83.18 57 -305.06 
Model J* (3 dim + YEW) 908 0.032 0.977 0.97 116.677 60 -292.00 
†: BIC not comparable to other models in table 
 
Model H is an alternate model, where the “boyorgrl” item is dropped from analysis, as it 
consistently has the lowest r-squared value of any indicator (once correlated errors are taken into 
account). It is a question about whether the genetic material to determine the sex of a baby comes 
from the mother or father, and it is likely that this is so nearly common knowledge that it makes 
a poor indicator of life sciences knowledge or science knowledge in general. It has good model 
fit, but as the set of observed variables is different, the BIC is not comparable to the other models 
presented here. 
The second alternate model is model I, where science knowledge breaks into three 
dimensions: life sciences, physical sciences, methods, plus the non-young earth worldview 
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dimension. This model has all dimensions distinct, which is of interest because a version of this 
model without the YEW dimension fails to keep the life sciences and methods dimensions 
separate (they correlate within two standard errors of 1). The change was the result of splitting 
LSFact as it exists in model G, the new dimensions have the following indicators: LSFact, or life 
sciences facts, is indicated by “boyorgrl” and “viruses”, while SKMeth, or methodological 
knowledge, is indicated by “odds1”, “odds2”, and “expdesgn”. This model is nested with the 
other models discussed here, and has one of the stronger BIC scores, though not as strong as 
model G (-305.06 vs -318.53, a difference of 13.47, which indicated strong support for model G; 
see Raftery, 1995:139). At any rate, this model may be used if one wishes to “salvage” the 
methodology dimension, though it is worth noting that the methodology dimension is very highly 
correlated with life and physical sciences, and the three items that make up the methodology 
dimension (“odds1”, “odds2”, and “expdesgn” have a strong life sciences bias - reproduction and 
genetics for the first two indicators and drug testing for the third; see below for more). 
Additionally, proper specification of the YEW dimension brings distinctions between the 
models more into focus, with the difference in BIC between model E and model J* being 26.53, 
indicating very strong support for G as the better fitting model (Raftery, 1995:139). 
Additional items from the GSS: “Astrosci” and “scistudy”  
 Two additional items that are typically present in most iterations of the NSF science 
knowledge scale are “astrosci” and “scistudy”, described below: 
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Table 15: Item wordings for “scistudy”, “scitext”, and “astrosci” indicators from the GSS 
Now, for a slightly different type of question. When you read news stories, you see certain sets 
of words and terms. We are interested in how many people recognize certain kinds of terms. 
First, some articles refer to the results of a scientific study. When you read or hear the term 
scientific study, do you have a clear understanding of what it means, a general sense of what it 
means, or little understanding of what it means? 
 
SCISTUDY: 1: Clear understanding 
2: General sense 
3: Little understanding 
 
In your own words, could you tell me what it means to study something scientifically? 
 
SCITEXT:1 1: Formulation of Theories, Test Hypotheses  
2: Do Experiments, Control Group  
3: Rigorous, Systematic Comparison  
4: Measurement  
5: Classification  
6: Redundancies/ Incorrect  
7: Don't Know/ Uncodeable  
8: No Answer/ Blank 
 
Would you say that astrology is very scientific, sort of scientific, or not at all scientific? 
 
ASTROSCI:2 1: Very scientific 
2: Sort of scientific 
3: Not at all scientific 
 
1: The first three are considered correct (Smith et al 2010). 
2: Only option 1 is considered correct in Evans 2011. 
 
The item “astrosci” has been in the NSF scales since 1979 (Miller et al 2009), as were 
“scistudy” and “scitext”. The latter two were conjoined: “scitext” was only asked if a respondent 
stated “clear understanding” or “general sense”, and the response was open-ended, with the 
interviewer coding the response into the categories listed for “scitext”. Miller (1998:213) found 
an inter-coder reliability of 0.9 in previous samples. An analysis of around 15,000 open ended 
responses to the “scistudy”/”scitext” items performed by Bauer and Schoon (1993) found a 
Kappa of .44 using the coding scheme above. They argue that the original coding scheme does 
not measure understanding of science in general but rather “the diffusion of a particular 
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[Popperian] notion of science among the public.” (1993:144). A similar open-ended question 
followed the “expdesgn” question, but as the “expdesgn” item works well as a closed-ended 
item, it is not used the analyses in the main body of the paper. 
The final model, E, and the alternate model retaining the methods dimension, I, were 
modified to test the fit with these additional indicators, using the original first half of the 2006 
GSS dataset. 
Table 16: Additional Models from Chapter 1: “astrosci” and “scistudy” 
Model n RMSEA CFI TLI Chi2 DF BIC 
W: Model E + A/S  SKMeth 908 0.027 0.982 0.977 135.872 82 -422.65 
X: Model E + A/S/E SKMeth 908 0.027 0.982 0.976 135.366 82 -423.16 
Y:  Model E, LSFact + SKMeth 908 0.026 0.982 0.978 135.594 85 -443.36 
Z: Model I, drop in 908 0.025 0.984 0.979 128.418 82 -430.10 
Z': 908 0.027 0.981 0.977 157.804 96 -496.08† 
 †: BIC not comparable to others 
 
In Model W, the “scistudy” and “astrosci” items were added to the model G structure as 
an additional dimension - that of scientific methodology. While the overall fit of W was good, 
the LSFact and SKMeth dimensions correlated at .923 with a standard error of .076, within 
sampling variation of one. Model Y allows the “expdesgn” item to load on SKMeth rather than 
LSFact, with a marginal increase in model fit and a similar problem on nondistinctness between 
SKMeth and LSFact - in this case they correlate at 1.033 with a se of .135, indicating that not 
only are they very likely one dimension, but a potential model misspecification. Model Y 
combines the SKMeth and LSFact dimensions into a single dimension, LSFact, made of 
indicators: “odds1”, “odds2, “viruses”, “boyorgrl”,  “scistudy”,  “astrosci”,  “expdesgn”. This is 
conceptually problematic, as while “expdesgn”, “odds1”, and “odds2” have a life sciences 
component, “scistudy” and “astrosci” do not. However, empirically this is the better-fitting 
model, even more so than model Z, described below. If the “scistudy” and “astrosci” items are to 
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be included, model Z makes better theoretical sense than model Y, even though model Y has 
much better fit (BIC difference of 13.26). 
Model Z is similar to model I above, with “scitext” and “astrosci” added to the SKMeth 
dimension, which consists of the items “expdesgn”, “odds1”, “odds2”, and now “scistudy” and 
“astrosci”. This model has better fit than the previous two (BIC difference of 6.94, indicating 
strong support for Z; Raftery 1995:139), and more importantly the dimensions LSFact and 
SKMEth remain highly correlated but distinct (correlation coefficient .781, se .081). A version of 
model Z, Z’ was estimated adding the “bible” variable, similar to what was done with models F 
and G above, the factor correlations and item r-squares are in Table 17 below. As in model G, 
the “bible” indicator when added to the YEW latent dimension did not greatly alter either the 
between-factor correlations nor the individual item r-squares for the model, lending strong 
support to the claim that the YEW dimension is of a religious nature. 
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Table 17: Model Z with “bible” indicator added 
Factor correlations Model Z (SE) Z’ + bib (SE) 
YEW with PFact -0.542 (.044) -0.603 (.039) 
YEW with LSFact -0.238 (.065) -0.303 (.061) 
YEW with SKMeth -0.334 (.062) -0.388 (.057) 
PFact with LSFact 0.660 (.066) 0.657 (.067) 
PFact with SKMeth 0.869 (.045) 0.870 (.045) 
LSFact with SKMeth 0.781 (.081) 0.778 (.081) 
R2         
BIBLE -  0.483 (.052) 
EXPDESGN 0.301 (.049) 0.302 (.050) 
ODDS1 0.410 (.065) 0.417 (.067) 
ODDS2 0.192 (.044) 0.189 (.045) 
HOTCORE 0.397 (.050) 0.387 (.049) 
RADIOACT 0.528 (.047) 0.539 (.047) 
BOYORGRL 0.159 (.041) 0.157 (.040) 
LASERS 0.524 (.049) 0.525 (.049) 
EVOLVED 0.735 (.091) 0.650 (.063) 
BIGBANG 0.602 (.082) 0.525 (.064) 
ELECTRON 0.370 (.044) 0.363 (.044) 
VIRUSES 0.706 (.121) 0.714 (.123) 
CONDRIFT 0.381 (.048) 0.414 (.049) 
EARTHSUN 0.476 (.047) 0.479 (.046) 
ASTROSCI 0.217 (.042) 0.219 (.042) 
SCISTUDY 0.290 (.052) 0.285 (.052) 
 
Table 18: Test of Model Z on other waves and samples 
Model n RMSEA CFI TLI Chi2 DF BIC 
Model Z 1995† 2006 0.026 0.973 0.965 193.121 82 -430.40 
Model Z 1997† 2000 0.022 0.979 0.973 164.8 82 -458.47 
Model Z 1999† 1882 0.021 0.983 0.978 152.635 82 -465.65 
Model Z 2001† 1574 0.021 0.983 0.978 139.634 82 -464.00 
Model Z 2006 (1st half) 908 0.025 0.984 0.979 128.418 82 -430.10 
Model Z 2006 (2nd half)* 956 0.023 0.983 0.979 124.732 82 -438.01 
Model Z 2008* 1503 0.031 0.972 0.964 196.826 82 -403.02 
Model Z 2010* 941 0.025 0.981 0.976 131.83 82 -429.62 
Model Z + tomatoes 2010* 941 0.030 0.973 0.966 178.19 96 -479.12 
†: not from the GSS - from National Science Foundation Surveys of Public Understanding of Science and 
Technology combined dataset, 1979-2006. 1995 was the first year the “expdesgn” and “boyorgrl” items were 
present. (Miller et al. 2009). 
*: In these samples, LSFact was not distinct from SKMeth - correlations were within two standard errors of 1. 
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 While the overall fit of model Z was consistent across all waves and samples, beginning 
in 2006 the LSFact or life sciences facts dimension was no longer distinct from SKMeth, or the 
methodology dimension - indicating that they may be a single dimension. It is for this reason, as 
well as the reservations about “astrosci” and “scistudy” raised above that the final model 
reported in the paper is model E. The following table compares the final and alternate models for 
the first half of the 2006 GSS with the “evolved” and “bigbang” items dropped from analysis: 
Table 19: Additional models estimated on 2006 GSS first half 
Model n RMSEA CFI TLI Chi2 DF BIC 
E** –bb -ev no yew 908 0.026 0.987 0.983 66.930 42 -219.14 
H** -bb -ev 908 0.022 0.992 0.989 47.758 33 -177.01† 
I**-bb -ev 908 0.023 0.990 0.986 59.177 40 -213.27 
J** -bb -ev 908 0.033 0.979 0.972 82.499 42 -203.57 
†: BIC not comparable to others. 
 
Table 19 shows final model G with 3 alternates run with “evolved” and “bigbang” 
dropped from analysis, and the YEW dimension removed (it is no longer identified). Once again, 
for the models with comparable BIC scores, model G’’, a two dimensional structure with a life 
sciences and a physical sciences  
Models D, E, and F with “bible” added to YEW 
Table 20: Model fit for models D, E, and F with “bible” added to the YEW dimension 
Model n RMSEA CFI TLI Chi2 DF BIC 
D': @1 + bib 908 0.033 0.975 0.968 145.155 72 -345.25 
E': model E + bib 908 0.021 0.984 0.979 119.764 72 -370.65 
F’: miller yew +bib 908 0.034 0.974 0.968 145.783 72 -344.63 
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Table 21: Factor loadings for indicators for Model E, from 1st half of 2006 sample (exploratory) 
Item Factor Loading S.E. 
LSFACT   
ODDS1 1† - 
ODDS2 0.668 (.084) 
EXPDESGN 0.817 (.094) 
VIRUSES 0.986 (.101) 
BOYORGRL 0.515 (.082) 
PFACT   
HOTCORE 1† - 
CONDRIFT 0.672 (.113) 
EARTHSUN 1.065 (.084) 
ELECTRON 0.937 (.080) 
RADIOACT 1.128 (.083) 
LASERS 1.130 (.090) 
YEWFACT   
EVOLVED 1† - 
BIGBANG 0.883 (.105) 
CONDRIFT 0.314 (.095) 
†: Factor loading forced to one to set scale for the latent variable. 
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APPENDIX THREE: ALTERNATE QUESTION WORDINGS IN 2012 
 
In the 2012 wave of the GSS, an alternate wording for the evolution and big bang item is present 
for a subset of the sample (N=481 cases). The alternate version of the evolution question is: 
“Humans developed from earlier species. (Is that true or false?)” and the alternate wording of the 
big bang item is “According to astronomers, the universe began with a huge explosion. (Is that 
true or false?)”. The changes are in the addition of the phrase “according to astronomers” to the 
big bang item, and the addition of the phrase “according to the theory of evolution” to the 
evolution item. A replication of the measurement model in Roos (Roos 2012) has good fit 
(χ2=79.56, DF=60; RMSEA=.026; CFI=.985; TLI=.980, BIC= -290.99), however in this 
measurement model the factor loadings for the continental drift item on RSO and PFact both 
become insignificant, suggesting that the continental drift item may no longer load on both 
dimensions. In tests where the continental drift item only loads on one factor, model fit is slightly 
better when it loads on PFact than when it loads on RSO. 
 The alternate item wordings have very different means (that is, the percentage of 
respondents that give the mainstream science correct answer is higher), with 70.83% of 
respondents choosing the mainstream science correct answer for the alternate wording of the 
evolution item (compared to 47.65% for the original in 2012), and 59.67% choosing the 
mainstream answer for the big bang item (compared to 37.94% for the original wording in 2012). 
This sharpening of the distinction between RSO and science knowledge coupled with the 
reduced rates of mainstream incorrect responses suggests that with the new item wordings RSO 
is even more strongly a signifier of a specific religious identity rather than science knowledge. In  
a replication of the full model on this subsample, the factor loading for the continental drift item 
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is no longer significant for RSO (but is significant for PFact), and other relationships are similar 
to that in the full model reported here. 
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